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Abstract
Three Essays on Trade and Development
Abhra Roy

In the first essay of this dissertation, we analyze the role of education subsidies on
child labor in a situation where parents choose the quantity of children to have as well as
their educational attainment. We find that lump sum education subsidies may increase
(decrease) the equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether
parents attach more weight on education (quality) or on school enrollment. Marginal
education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Some authors have found
that a rise in the cost of schooling decreases child labor in some countries while
increasing it in others. We are able to explain why one may observe these seemingly
contradictory effects of subsidies on child labor across countries.
In the second essay I look at the effect of trade liberalization on child labor in the
context of both a small and a large country. We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on
child labor and fertility with respect to a small country. We show that tariffs may increase
(or decrease) child labor and fertility depending on the slope of the labor supply curve and
the type of equilibrium (high or low fertility). For a large country, fertility and child labor
may qualitatively and quantitatively alter the effect of tariffs on the terms of trade. We find
that in some cases, a rise in the tariff may deteriorate the terms of trade (starting from a
zero tariff) and therefore an import subsidy may be optimal.
The third essay investigates whether preferential trading agreements are building
blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade. We use MFN and applied tariff data for 146
countries (including the European Union,) from 1988-2002, and conclude that free trade
areas (bilateral and multination) are stumbling blocs to trade. We also find that countries
that sign more PTAs give lower tariff reductions than countries that don’t. WTO members
are also found to offer lower tariff reductions than non WTO members.
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Chapter 1
A Brief Overview of the Dissertation

1

Chapter 1
Introduction, Review of Literature and a Brief Overview

1.

Introduction
The essays in this dissertation address some current issues in Development

Economics and International Trade. The first essay, analyzes the role of education
subsidies and its impact on child labor. The problem of child labor is a facet mainly
associated with developing countries. In Asia and the Pacific region, there are 127 million
economically active children (60% of total number of economically active children in the
world) and in Sub-Saharan Africa about 48 million children are engaged in child labor.
Although the issue of child labor has featured prominently in recent global trade
discussions, child labor practices all over the world have been declining. There have been
rapid changes in countries like Italy, China, and India. In some African and Latin
American countries, this decline has been less marked. Lately, however, child labor has
been enjoying renewed interest, which can be attributed partly to increased globalization.
Trade has made goods from far-off lands available to people in high-income countries.
Innovations in information and communication technology have made consumers, in the
developed world, aware of the working conditions of children in different parts of the
world wasting away their childhood in sweatshops. As Basu (1999) notes, these recent
developments have brought people from very different backgrounds, and with very
different perspectives on the issue, onto the same platform. On one side, we have people
who are genuinely concerned about the plight of children all over the world; while on the
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other side, we have people who seek protection against cheap third world labor, hiding
under the mask of ‘concern for working children’.
According to recent International Labor organization (ILO) estimates, there were
about 186 million working children (“child labor”) between the ages of 5-14 in 2000. The
sheer magnitude of the number itself is alarming even if one ignores the conditions in
which they work. The number alluded above is more restrictive, the estimate jumps to
around 211 million (ILO 2002) if one chooses to employ a broader definition such as the
number of economically active children. The estimate of child labor goes to 246 million if
one takes children in the age group of 5-17 into consideration. Regardless of which
definition one uses, the inescapable fact remains that incidence of child labor is a major
problem.
Often these children work in industries that pose serious threat to their physical and
mental well-being. In India, children working in the carpet industry toil for long hours
under ill-lit, ill-ventilated and damp surroundings. Children working in leather
manufacturing, chemical industries are also subject to serious health hazards. Children
working more than 43 hours a week also suffer exhaustion, which takes a slow but steady
toll on their health. Children engaged in prostitution, armed conflict, bonded labor, and
serfdom (classified under the worst forms of child labor) are subject to severe physical as
well as psychological harm. There are about 171 million children in hazardous work, like
mining, chemical industries, leather, handlooms, and about 8.4 million children are in
bonded labor, prostitution, serfdom, or, participating in armed conflict.
The fallout of recent global trade discussions has been to seek measures to put a
stop to these practices. Such measures, both punitive and non-punitive, range from banning
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all goods that use child labor as an input like senator Harkin’s Bill in the U.S., suspension
of GSP privileges, trade sanctions, naming and shaming of firms who employ child labor,
etc. Unfortunately, these measures have eclipsed formal analysis by quite a margin. It is
indeed painful to see children work, foregoing the option of education, and consequently to
ensure a better future for themselves. The alternative of not working as a child labor,
however, may be to starve or to do household chores, which have a lower rate of return.
We believe that fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about
child labor. Given that child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital
accumulation of parents and zero savings, parents are more likely to endogenize their
decision on how many children to have. In many developing countries children are the
only source of support to the old. For instance in countries like India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, especially among the poor; it is the children’s responsibility to take care of the
parents in their old age.
Since the role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, in
the first essay we focus primarily on the consequences of education subsidies on child
labor. This is relevant because following the threat of trade sanctions and suspension of
GSP privileges; many developing countries are aggressively pursuing educational policy to
reduce the incidence of child labor. We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one
good model, where parents choose the quantity of children to have as well as their
educational attainment.
In the second essay, we look at the impact of trade liberalization on child labor
from the perspective of a small and a large open economy. Recently the issue of child labor
has been at the center of debate and discussion in recent global trade discussions. Side by
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side the rapid increase in the number of preferential agreements (PTAs) in the world over
the last few decades, for both developed and less developed countries have sparked debate
about the welfare consequences of PTAs. Even WTO members are involved in bilateral
trading agreements. For instance, PTAs like ASEAN, MERCOSUR and ATPA are among
developing countries that allow child labor.1 Multilateral trade negotiations through the
WTO are under way, albeit slowly. Thus, the issue of trade liberalization both
multilaterally and through PTAs is of major concern in terms of its effects on child labor.
We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on child labor and fertility in the
context of a small and large country. Many small countries that host child labor have
formed PTAs. Some countries have also liberalized their trade multilaterally. Therefore the
issue of trade liberalization and its effects on child labor are relevant. In the context of
large country we analyze the tariff structure in the presence of child labor and endogenous
fertility.
In his 1958 paper, Bhagwati shows that growth that expands a country’s exports
can lower its welfare (immiserizing growth) through a large deterioration in the terms of
trade. In a subsequent paper, a Bhagwati (1968) show that growth cannot be immiserizing
if an optimal tariff is imposed. The adverse terms of trade effect resulting from the growth
of the export sector can be corrected by imposing a tariff on the importable. In his model,
tariffs do not by themselves affect the growth of factors of production; in our model the
growth in the factor of production is endogenous through the effect of tariffs on factor
rewards. We find that in the case of a large open economy, tariffs may deteriorate the terms
of trade under some conditions, if fertility is endogenous and child labor practices are at

1

Singapore and Chile are notable exceptions.
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force.2 In that case, the optimal tariff turns out to be negative, i.e., an import subsidy is
optimal.
The third essay examines the empirics of whether Preferential trading agreements
(PTAs) slowdown or promotes the multilateral trade liberalization process. Over the last
decade, there has been a substantial rise in the number of PTAs in the world. According to
the WTO, there will be about 300 PTAs in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members
and all the large countries are members of some Preferential Trading Unions, the effect of
PTAs on world trade is at the center of debate among trade theorists and policymakers. The
dynamic time path question is: do PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral trade
liberalization (MTL), expand in a fashion that eventually subsumes all countries as its
members without trade barriers (MTL path)? Or, do they undermine MTL by fragmenting
the world into a number of powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers between each
other?
If membership into a PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce
multilateral tariffs because they undermine the preferences given to other nations. One
example Limao (2003) provides is that of low–value bottled and bulk rum, which enters
the United States from several Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In
her testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and
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The cocoa producing countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Brazil have some market power and also
employ children in the production of cocoa.
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Means on May 8th, 2001, Hon. Donna M. Christian-Christensen, Delegate from the United
States Virgin Islands, stated that U.S. and E.U. negotiators had initially agreed during the
1996 WTO tariff negotiations to phase out all tariffs on rum by 2000. This decision faced
vehement opposition from Caribbean Governments, Administration Officials and Members
of Congress. They emphasized that such a cut in tariffs for rum would deal a severe blow
to the economies of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. Their
insistence resulted in a carefully constructed compromise under which the United States
agreed to substantially liberalize duties on expensive rum. To protect the interest of the
U.S. Virgin Islands and other Caribbean Island producers, however, the United States also
agreed to maintain existing MFN rates on low-value bottled and bulk rum.
Given the second best nature of the problem, there is no a-priori reason to believe
that PTAs are necessarily stumbling blocs or building blocs. It is easier to examine the
effect of PTAs on multilateral trade barriers to infer whether they are stumbling or building
blocs rather than look at the probability of occurrence of another round of multilateral trade
negotiations. Limao (2003) shows that the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions to nonmembers on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods that are
imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He, however,
focuses only on U.S. and its PTA partners.
The increase in the number of PTAs was particularly pronounced during 1990.
Most countries either formed new or joined existing PTAs. At the same time many
countries, however, also liberalized trade multilaterally. For instance, India liberalized its
trade multilaterally in 1991. The multilateral trade liberalization process was most notable
after 1995. We find that MFN and applied average tariffs (simple and weighted) have
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fallen significantly from 1988-2002. We, therefore, use a trend to capture the secular fall in
tariff due to multilateral trade liberalization pursued by these countries. After controlling
for the trend, we find that the presence of customs unions and Free trade areas cannot
explain this downward fall in tariffs. We find that countries that are not members of any
FTA offer higher tariff reductions than countries that are members of some FTA. This
finding is similar to that of Limao (2003). The crucial difference is that we take into
account all CUs and FTAs that were notified to the WTO (for these 161 countries) while
he uses tariff concessions data on individual goods for the U.S. and its PTAs.

1.2. Review of Relevant Literature
The review of the literature is divided into three sub-sections. In the first section,
we review the relevant literature for the first essay. The second section refers to the
research relevant for the second essay and the third section lists the papers that were
pertinent for the third essay.

1.2.1 Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child Labor
There is growing theoretical and empirical literature concerning the causes and
consequences of child labor. Basu and Van (1998) show that in less developed countries,
parents send children to work not due a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity.
They show that there may be multiple equilibria, either good or bad. In the bad
equilibrium, parents send their children to work and in the good equilibrium they do not.
Baland and Robinson (2000) find that even if parents are altruistic and child labor is
socially inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because of imperfect capital markets and
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zero savings. They also derive conditions under which a ban on child labor is Pareto
improving.
Using an overlapping generations general equilibrium model, Ranjan (2001) shows
that inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints. He also establishes a positive
relationship between inequality of income distribution and the incidence of child labor and
that trade sanctions may or may not curb child labor.
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor
decreases, as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually
increase the incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to
credit is poor. The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) show the effect of trade sanction in a
general equilibrium trade model with two traded and one non-traded good. They find that
the effect of trade sanctions on child labor depends crucially on the pattern of
substitutability or complementarity of the excess demand functions between the export
good and the non-traded good. They also find that trade sanctions reduces national welfare
regardless of its effects on child labor. They show that an education subsidy for unskilled
households reduces child labor.
Tzannatos (1996) finds that Thai children under the age of 12 do not initially leave
school in order to work. According to the ILO estimates, 5.4% of all children (between the
ages of 5-9 years) in the world are engaged in full time work. The estimate increases to
13.1 when one considers children between 10-14 yrs of age. LFP rate among children (5-
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14 yrs) is 17% in Latin America, 21% in Asia and 40% in Africa, given that the
compulsory school age is 14. This strongly suggests that parents not only choose whether
to enroll their children in schools but also the level of their children’s education.
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child
will work. She suggests that the cost of education in this case serves as a proxy for school
quality. In most developing countries, however, schools, which cater to the poor in both
rural and urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately
staffed and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation, etc. Quality considerations
therefore, cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of
schooling.
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that in Bolivia cost of schooling increases the
probability that a child will work. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries.

1.2.2. Endogenous Fertility, Child Labor and Optimal Tariffs
Faced with threats of trade sanctions or suspension of GSP3 privileges, most
countries are aggressively adopting policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. We
examine the impact of reduction in tariff barriers on child labor and fertility in the second
essay of this dissertation. So far as tariffs affect household income through changes in

3

Generalized System of Preference.
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factor rewards and consequently on labor supply decisions, bilateral or multilateral trade
liberalization, tariff reductions impact the incidence of child labor and fertility.
The focus of the literature on child labor has been to outline the causes and
consequences of child labor. Parents in less developed countries send their children to
work not because of a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. Basu and Van
(1998) hold that the labor market may be characterized by multiple equilibria. In the bad
equilibrium wages are low and therefore parents send their children to work; in the good
equilibrium wages are high and consequently the same parents do not send their children to
work. A ban on child labor merely shocks the economy from a bad to a good equilibrium.
According to Baland and Robinson (2000), child labor arises because of zero bequests
arising out of poverty or imperfect or non–existent capital markets despite parental
altruism. They show that if general equilibrium effects are well-behaved, then an
endogenous change in the wage induced by the reduction in child labor may make parents
and firms better off.
Ranjan (2001) is the first to show that trade sanctions against countries which
harbor child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor. He also shows that child
labor arises due to credit constraints. He derives a positive relation between income
distribution inequality and the incidence of child labor.
According to Jafferey and Lahiri (2002), the incidence of child labor decreases as
access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor.
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved. The authors find that both
poverty and poor quality of education are important determinants of child labor.
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In a general equilibrium model, Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) have
found the effect of the terms of trade on child labor depends critically on the pattern of
substitutability (or complementarity) in excess demand functions. The effect of terms of
trade on income distribution depends critically on whether the terms of trade change
happens in the present or the future. The authors conclude that taxing the education of
skilled households and using the revenues to subsidize the education of unskilled
households is a more effective policy in developing nations than using trade sanctions.

1.2.3. Are Preferential Trading Agreements Stumbling Blocs to Multilateral
Trade?
There has not been a lot of empirical research focused on the effect of PTA
formation on MTL. Some theoretical studies have been done, although theorists remain
divided on the wisdom of whether PTAs promote or slowdown MTL. A few authors have
shown that PTAs may reduce a country’s incentive for MTL. Levy (1997) shows the
possibility to enter a PTA may cause a median voter to subsequently reject multilateral free
trade even though he would have accepted it if no PTA had been available. Grossman and
Helpman (1994) show that when producers are organized in lobbies the PTAs that are most
likely to occur are the ones that cause the largest trade diversion. Krishna (1998) shows
similar results using a different setup. He also argues that these PTAs can reduce the
incentive to MTL. This occurs because the rents generated by the formations of these
PTAs disappear when countries liberalize trade multilaterally. Producers that benefit from
PTAs, therefore, will oppose MTL. In pure trade model with sequential bargaining,
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members may hold back tariff concessions on
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goods exported by countries expected to accede to the WTO. Limao (2002) models the
interaction between PTAs between a large and a small country (Large Small PTA or
LSPTA) and MTL. He shows that LSPTAs generate a strategic motive for large countries
to maintain some of their multilateral tariffs relatively higher.
Some authors have shown that PTAs can actually be building blocs to multilateral
trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1998) used a repeated game to analyze how PTAs affect the
incentive to set a self-enforcing tariff. They show that two countries, A and B, gain from a
PTA if they are relatively more patient than the third one, C. Also, when A and B lower
tariffs for each other, they import more from each other and less from C. This reduces the
cost of lowering tariffs on C. The last effect is independent of how patient A and B are.
Thus, they show PTAs are stumbling blocs if A and B are very patient, and building blocs
otherwise.
Limao (2003) uses detailed data on U.S. tariff concessions during the most recent
multilateral trade round to conclude that PTAs were a significant stumbling bloc to
multilateral trade liberalization. He shows that the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions to
non-members on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods
that are imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He
focuses only on the United States and its PTA partners, whereas our empirical analysis is
more general in the sense that it includes all PTAs (except preferential arrangements
granted on an individual good basis).

1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
In the three subsections that follow, we highlight the major contributions of the
three essays in my dissertation. The first two essays in my dissertation develop theoretical
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models for child labor and optimal tariffs in the presence of endogenous fertility. The third
essay is an empirical analysis of impact of preferential trading agreements on multilateral
trade liberalization. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapters 2,
3, and 4 present the theoretical and empirical analysis. Chapter 5 provides a brief summary
and conclusion as well as future research ideas. Below is a brief description of the results
from Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

1.3.1 Overview of Chapter 2
In the theoretical model we have developed, a representative unskilled household
chooses the number of children to have, the level of education, and the number of children
to send to work. Parents also decide the level of educational attainment of children.
Children are not allowed to combine work and school.4 Parents are assumed to attach
different weights to school enrollment as well as quality. All children who go to school,
however, receive the same level of education. We measure total quality by the product of
enrollment and quality of each educated child.
Our results indicate that lump sum education subsidies may increase (or decrease)
the equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach
more weight to quality (or the number of children in school) ignoring fertility effects.
Marginal education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal
and lump sum education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education
subsidies including elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor.
The Mexican government launched a program, PROGRESA, to eradicate child
labor. It reports that although the enrollment in primary school is fairly comprehensive
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(93-94%), it drops to (55%) once children reach the sixth standard. There is also a
significant drop in enrollment when children reach the tenth standard, only 58% of those
who are qualified actually enroll. Brazil increased the compulsory school age from 11 to
14 in 1971, yet 85% left for the work force before they reached 14 regardless of whether or
not they were covered by the revised legislation.
We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one good model where parents
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. Since the
role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, we focus on the
consequences of education subsidies on child labor. This is relevant because following the
threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges many developing countries are
aggressively pursuing educational policy to reduce the incidence of child labor.
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to show that educational
subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a child to work. Our
results hold when fertility effects are included, provided fertility moves in the same
direction as child labor. This occurs if the marginal utility of having another child
decreases (or increases) with quality.

1.3.2 Overview of Chapter 3
Our focus in Chapter 3 is to see the effect of tariffs (with respect to a small country)
on fertility and the incidence of child labor. We find that, for the small open economy,
tariffs may increase (or decrease) fertility depending not only on whether the economy is
characterized by a high fertility or low fertility equilibrium but also the slope of the labor
4

Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead we assumed that all children combine work and school
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supply function. If the labor supply function is positively sloped, child labor rises in the
high fertility equilibrium in response to a wage increase. In the paper, we outline the
conditions under which the labor supply curve is positively sloped. This is of particular
interest due to the recent proliferation of PTAs in the world.
Moreover, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped, then the optimal tariff in
the presence of endogenous fertility and child labor may be higher or lower than the tariff
in place. Optimal tariffs, which neglect the effect of endogenous fertility and the presence
of child labor, may impose significant losses in welfare from the standpoint of the tariff
imposing country.
The literature on optimal trade policy suggests that for a large country a positive
tariff barrier may improve its welfare through the terms of trade effect. A related issue is to
inspect the effect of tariffs on terms of trade in a large country framework when fertility
decisions are endogenous and child labor practices exist. The idea is that a large country
solely concerned with national interest should restrict trade so as to exploit its market
power. We analyze the role of tariffs in a large country general equilibrium framework
with endogenous fertility and the presence of child labor. We find that compared to the
scenario where child labor practices are non-existent and fertility decisions are not
endogenized the presence of child labor and fertility change the nature of optimal tariffs.
Unless the optimal tariff imposed under the first scenario (without child labor and
endogenous fertility) is of some given magnitude, is either too high or too low. In some
cases the optimal trade tariff may become negative.

identically.
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1.3.3 Overview of Chapter 4
In the third essay, we examine the empirics of whether Preferential Trading
Agreements (PTAs) slowdown or promote the multilateral trade liberalization process and
address the dynamic path questions from the perspective of increasing membership in
preferential trading agreements. We test whether joining more PTAs is associated with
higher barriers to trade. So far, such a comprehensive analysis has not been conducted. We
use MFN and applied tariff data for 146 countries (including the European Union) from
1988-2002 and take account of all Customs unions and Free trade areas that were notified
to the WTO till 2003 by these countries to show that bilateral and multilateral Free trade
areas5 are stumbling blocs to MTL.
We also find that, as an institution for multilateral tariff liberalization, the WTO has
been more effective than the GATT. We find that average tariffs have fallen considerably
after 1995 (i.e., after the formation of WTO). On the contrary, tariff rates were roughly
constant under GATT; in fact average tariffs actually went up during 1989. Furthermore,
our results indicate that GATT/WTO members offer lower multilateral tariff reductions
than non-GATT/WTO members. Since tariff reductions by a member must be extended to
all other GATT/ WTO members, it creates a disincentive for large tariff reductions.
Customs unions are found to have no stumbling or building bloc effect to multilateral trade
liberalization. This may be due to the limited variation of new membership or the lack of
formation of new customs union from 1988. Moreover, countries that sign more PTAs
seem to have higher average multilateral tariffs than those who do not.

5

We focus our attention to customs unions and Free Trade Areas. Preferences by countries granted under
Article V of GATT are ignored except that we take GSP into account. Since we work with average tariffs
over all goods and partner countries we do not include preferences granted on an individual good basis.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child labor:
Do subsidies work?

Abstract
We analyze the role of education subsidies on child labor in a situation where parents
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. This is relevant
because following the threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges, many developing
countries are actively pursuing education policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. We find
that lump sum education subsidies may increase (decrease) the equilibrium level of education and
child labor depending on whether parents attach more weight on education (quality) or on school
enrollment. Marginal education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Some authors
have found that a rise in the cost of schooling decreases child labor in some countries while
increasing it in others. We are able to explain why one may observe these seemingly contradictory
effects of subsidies on child labor across countries.
JEL Classification: O10; O15; J13; J24
Keywords: Child Labor; Endogenous Fertility; Education Subsidies
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2.1. Introduction
According to recent International Labor organization (ILO) estimates, there were
about 186 million working children (“child labor”) between the ages of 5-14 in 2000. The
sheer magnitude of the number itself is alarming, even if one ignores the conditions in
which they work. The number alluded above is more restrictive, the estimate jumps to
around 211 million (ILO 2002) if one chooses to employ a broader definition such as the
number of economically active children. The problem of child labor is a facet mainly
associated with developing countries. In Asia and the Pacific region there are 127 million
economically active children (60% of total number of economically active children in the
world). Sub Saharan Africa accounts for 48 million. The estimate of child labor fluctuates
widely, depending on how one defines work and a child, for instance, the estimate of child
labor goes to 246 million if one takes children in the age group 5-17 into consideration.
Regardless of which definition one uses, the inescapable fact remains that incidence of
child labor is a problem of epic proportions.
Some children work in industries, which pose serious threat to their physical and
mental wellbeing. In India, children working in the carpet industry, toil for long hours
under ill lit, ill ventilated and damp surroundings. Children working in leather
manufacturing and chemical industries are also subject to serious health hazards. Children
working more than 43 hours a week also suffer exhaustion, which takes a slow but steady
toll on their wellbeing. Children engaged in prostitution, armed conflict, bonded labor,
serfdom, classified under the worst forms of child labor, are subject to severe physical as
well as psychological harm. There are about 171 million children in hazardous work, like
mining, chemical industries, leather, handlooms etc. Further, 8.4 million children work in
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bonded labor, prostitution, serfdom, armed conflict etc. These numbers, although shocking,
unfortunately do not sum up the plight of working children.
Although the issue of child labor has featured prominently in recent global trade
discussions, the problem despite being of epic proportions, luckily has seen its heyday.
Child labor practices all over the world have declined, rapidly in some countries like Italy,
China, and India and less marked in some countries in Africa and the Latin Americas. The
renewed interest in child labor can be attributed partly to increased globalization. Trade has
brought goods produced in far-off lands into the lap of people in high-income countries. It
has made people more aware of the working conditions of children in different parts of the
world producing them. These, on the other hand, as Basu (1999) notes, have brought very
different people on the same platform. On one side we have people who are genuinely
concerned with the plight of children all over the world; while on the other hand we also
have people who seek protection against cheap third world labor, hiding under the mask of
‘concern for working children’.
The fallout of recent global trade discussions has been to seek measures to put a
stop to these practices. Such measures, both punitive and non-punitive, range from banning
all goods that use child labor as an input like senator Harkin’s bill in the U.S., suspension
of GSP privileges, trade sanctions, naming and shaming of firms who use child labor as an
input, etc. Unfortunately, these measures have eclipsed formal analysis by quite a margin.
It is indeed painful to see children work and forego the option of going to school and
consequently earn a better living in the future but the alternative of not working as a child
labor may be to starve or to do household chores which have a lower rate of return.
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There is growing theoretical and empirical literature concerning the causes and
consequences of child labor. Basu and Van (1998) show that in less developed countries,
parents sent children to work not due a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity.
They show that there may be multiple equilibria, good and bad, in the bad equilibrium
parents send their children to work and in the good equilibrium they do not. Baland and
Robinson (2000) find that even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially
inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because of imperfect capital markets and zero
savings. They also derive conditions under which a ban on child labor is Pareto improving.
Ranjan (2001) uses an overlapping generations general equilibrium model to show
that inefficient child labor arises due to credit constraints. The paper also establishes a
positive relationship between inequality of income distribution and the incidence of child
labor and that trade sanctions may or may not curb child labor.
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor decreases
as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor.
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) show the effect of trade sanction in a
general equilibrium trade model with two traded and one non-traded good. They find that
the effect of trade sanctions on child labor depends, crucially on the pattern of
substitutability or complementarity of the excess demand functions between the export
good and the non-traded good. They also find that trade sanctions reduces national welfare
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regardless of its effects on child labor. They show that an education subsidy for unskilled
households reduces child labor.
We analyze the role of education subsidies in a one good model where parents
choose the quantity of children to have as well as their educational attainment. Since the
role of poverty and capital market imperfection has been well explored, we focus on the
consequences of education subsidies on child labor. This is relevant because following the
threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP privileges; many developing countries are
aggressively pursuing educational policy to reduce the incidence of child labor.
We believe that fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about
child labor. Given that child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital
accumulation of parents and zero savings, parents are more likely to endogenise their
decision on how many children to have. In many developing countries, children are the
only source of support to the old. For instance, in countries like India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, especially among the poor, older people co-reside with their children.
Parents also decide the level of educational attainment of children. PROGRESA, a
program launched by the Mexican government, to eradicate child labor, reports that
although the enrollment in primary school is fairly comprehensive (93-94%), it drops to
(55%) once children reach the sixth standard. There is also a significant drop in enrollment,
when children reach the tenth standard, only 58% of those who are qualified, actually
enroll. Brazil increased the compulsory school age from 11 to 14 in 1971, yet 85% left for
the work force before they reached 14, regardless of whether or not they were covered by
the revised legislation.
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Tzannatos (1996) finds that Thai children under the age of 12 do not initially leave
school in order to work. According to the ILO estimates, 5.4% of all children (between the
ages of 5-9 years), in the world are engaged in full time work. The estimate, increases to
13.1 when one considers children between 10-14 yrs of age. LFP rate among children (514 yrs) is 17% in Latin America, 21% in Asia and 40% in Africa, given that the
compulsory school age is 14. This strongly suggests that parents not only choose whether
to enroll their children in schools but also the level of education of children.
In the model that follows, a representative unskilled household chooses the number
of children to have, the level of education, and the number of children to send to work.
Children are not allowed to combine work and school.6 Parents are assumed to attach
different weights to school enrollment as well as quality. All children who go to school
however receive the same level of education. Total quality is measured by the product of
enrollment and quality of each educated child.
We find that lump sum education subsidies may increase (decrease) the equilibrium
level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach more weight to
quality (or the number of children in school), ignoring fertility effects. Marginal education
subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal and lump sum
education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education subsidies including
elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor.
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to throw light on the empirical
finding that educational subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a

6

Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead assumed that all children combine work and school
identically.
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child to work. If fertility effects are included then our results follow provided fertility
effects are small in magnitude.
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child
will work. She suggests that, the cost of education serves as a proxy for school quality.
However in most developing countries, schools, which cater to the poor in both rural and
urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately staffed
and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation etc. Thus quality considerations
cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of schooling.
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that cost of schooling increases the probability
that a child will work in Bolivia. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries. We
present the model and the results in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 concludes.

2.2. The Model
A representative unskilled household characterizes the economy. The household
consumes good M . The price of M is normalized to unity. The household’s utility
depends on the consumption, the number of children born to it, the number of children
going to school as well as the educational attainment of children in school. To make the
analyses simple, we assume that the household’s utility function is separable in
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consumption good and the quantity and quality of children. We also assume that they have
linear preferences over M .
The utility of an unskilled household is given byU ( M , n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) ;
where M denotes consumption of the numeraire good. The household is endowed with
one unit of adult unskilled labor. The number of children in the family is given by

n ; g (e, g ) is the stock of human capital (‘quality’) per child going to school which is a
function of education ‘ e ’. On the other hand, g may be interpreted as a factor, which
enhances the transformation of education into human capital, which could be quality of
schooling or endowment of talent in children. The household cares about the number of
children going to school as well as the quality of children going to school; α and 1- α are
the weights attached to number of children going to school and the quality of children in
school respectively. Children sent to school however receive the same level of education.
Children, who do not attend school, are assumed to be endowed with one unit of
human capital, i.e., g (0, g ) = 1 . We follow Becker and Lewis (1973) and assume that the
household cares about the quantity and the quality of children with one exception. In their
model, it is assumed that all children are of the same quality and parents do not make any
distinction among their children. Here we depart from them and assume that although
parents care about the number of children born to the family, they may or may not view all
children as being the same in terms of their choices, i.e., the household may send some
children to school and some to work (though nothing hinges on this).7

7

Our results go through if instead of assuming that parents send ( n − L C ) children to school, we assume that
all children combine work and school. Each child is endowed with 1 unit of labor, which must be allocated
between work and acquiring human capital. We let each child devote (1 − L C ) units of labor to school. Since
there are

n

children, total school enrollment is then n (1 −
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LC ) .

This allows us to entertain the possibilities where all children are sent to school, all
children are sent to work and some are sent to school while the rest go to work. The first
and the second possibility are corner solutions and therefore are of limited interest in the
analysis because marginal changes in policy responses will have no effect on them. We
focus our attention to the third possibility where the family makes decisions at the margin,
how many children to have, how many to send to school, etc. To make the analysis
tractable, we also assume that the utility function, noted above, takes the following simple
form
LetU ( M , n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) = M + K (n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) ;
where α ∈ [0,1] ... (1)
The utility function, K (.), embodies the satisfaction of the household from having

n children, the number of children sent to school, (n − LC ) , as well as the quality of
children attending school g (e, g ) . The parameter α reflects the preferences of the
household over the number of children going to school and the educational attainment of
these children. If α = 0 then households care only about the average quality of children
attending school. If α = 1, then households only care about how many children go to
school. The reality of course includes these two extremes and in general some combination
of these.
We assume, K(.) , is twice differentiable and strictly concave with K2 > 0, K22 < 0,

K11 < 0. Further we assume that, K1 , can be positive or negative. The negative marginal
utility of having an additional child captures the congestion effect with respect to the
number of children born to the family. As the number of children born increases, parental
responsibility also increases, which may create a disutility from having more children. A
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bigger family also requires a higher degree of time commitment, which may reduce utility
at the margin. More children also mean more rivalry in domestic consumption, which may
reduce the utility from having another child. We also assume that g1 > 0, g11 < 0, g 2 > 0,

g 22 < 0 and g12 > 0. Quality increases in response to education at a decreasing rate.
Exactly similar results obtain for school quality.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following budget constraint.

M = [ w{1 − C (e)(n − LC ) − V (n)}] + wLC + wg (e, g )(n − LC )

(2)

The left hand side represents the consumption of M . The right hand side represents
income of the household. w is the wage rate. C (e)(n − LC ) is the total cost of
educating (n − LC ) children. C (e) is the cost of education per child, which is given by:
C (e) = u + φ (e) ; u > 0, φ ′ (e) >0, φ ′′ (e) > 0;
where ‘ u ’ is the part of the education cost, which does not increase with education and
hence will be called the fixed cost of education. It may be interpreted as barriers to entry in
education. It is reasonable to expect that unskilled households face significant barriers to
entry. The low educational attainment of the parents makes imparting education more
difficult. The use of facilities such as the libraries, computers, and books are clearly
outside the reach of the unskilled household. The subjective notion about education is also
significantly different.

LC is the number of children who go to work, forgoing the option of going to
school. V (n) is the cost of bringing up children, which we call ‘rearing cost’. We assume
V (.) is increasing and convex. ‘ w ’ is the wage received by unskilled adult labor. The
education and rearing costs are measured in units of labor time.
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As noted above, g (e, g ) , is the amount of human capital acquired by a child going
to school. It is worthwhile to note that the skilled wage, measured in efficiency units,
depends on the amount of human capital one acquires. We would expect skilled wages to
rise in response to an increase in human capital. Also for a given level of education, the
amount of human capital one acquires may be influenced by factors such as quality of
schooling, individual characteristics such as talent, luck, so on and so forth. Since policy
changes cannot influence the endowment of talent or luck, we interpret, g , as the quality of
schooling, which can be influenced by changes in government expenditure, foreign aid etc.
The first term in the right hand side of equation (2) is the income from adult labor,
net of rearing cost and the wages foregone in educating children. The second term reflects
the income from child labor. We assume that a child born to a family can either go to
school or work. The third term reflects the earnings of children who become skilled adults.
The households maximizes (1) subject to (2). The first order conditions are as
follows:1 -λ = 0

(3)

K1 + K2α (n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) 1− α + wg (e, g ) = wV '(n) + wC(e)

(4)

K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α −1 g − α g1 + wg1 = wφ '(e)

(5)

wC (e) + w ≥ wg (e, g ) + K 2α (n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) 1− α

(6)

Note that if equation (6) holds with the strict inequality then all children will be
sent to work. Marginal changes in policy, in that case will have no impact on child labor.
Therefore we assume that the equation holds with equality.
Equation (4) gives us the optimal number of children in the family. The left hand
side represents the marginal benefit from increasing fertility whereas the right hand side
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represents the cost of increasing fertility. The change in utility in response to change in
fertility is given by K1 (n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) . The wages earned by the marginal child as
a skilled adult, is given by wg (e, g ) . The total cost of bringing up and educating the
marginal child, is captured by wC (e) + wV ' (n) . In equilibrium, we must have that the
marginal benefit from increasing fertility should be equal to the marginal cost.
Equation (5) gives us the optimal level of education. The left hand side represents
the marginal benefit from increase in quality and the right hand side reflects the cost of
doing so. The change in wages earned by the children as skilled adults in response to a unit
change in the level of education is given by w(n − LC ) g1 (e, g ). The satisfaction received by
the parent due to the change in quality in response to change in education is given by
K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) − α g1 . The right hand side represents the rise in cost due to a unit
increase in the level of education captured by w(n − LC )φ '(e) . In equilibrium the marginal
benefit and the cost must balance each other.
Equation (6) gives us the optimal level of child labor from the perspective of the
family. The left hand side represents the opportunity cost of sending a child to school and
the right hand side represents the gains from education and the increase in satisfaction from
not sending a child to work. If it holds with strict inequality, then all children are sent to
work and marginal changes in policy have no effect on parents’ decision to send a child to
work. Therefore we focus on the case where the equation holds with equality so that
changes in policy have some effect on child labor and fertility decisions.
Rearranging equation (5) we get
K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) − α g1 = w(φ ' (e) − g1 )
Rearranging equation (6) we get
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(5)′

K2 (n − LC ) α −1 =

where µ (e) =

w(c(e) + 1 − g (e))
= wµ (e)
αg 1−α

(6)′

(c(e) + 1 − g (e))
αg 1−α

Plugging this back in (5), we get
g1 [1 + (1 − α ) g − α µ ] = φ ' (e)

(5)″

This implicitly defines e = e(u, g , α , δ ) . Substituting the expression from (6) in (4)
we get the following equation
K1 (n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) + w = wV '(n)

(7)

The equilibrium level of education, fertility, child labor and consumption of M
are obtained recursively as follows. Given ‘ w ’, ‘ u ’ and ‘ g ’ the equilibrium level of
education, e ∗ , is obtained from (5)′.
Equation (6) implicitly defines LC = LC (n, e, w, u, g ) . Using this in equation (4), we
get n = n(e, u, w, g ) . Plugging e ∗ in (4), gives us the equilibrium level of fertility n ∗ .
Plugging e ∗ and n ∗ in equation (6), gives us the optimal level of child labor LC ∗ . The
equilibrium level of M is obtained from equation (3). For simplicity we assume that the
cost of education takes the following simple form. C (e) = u + δe .
Proposition 1: ∃ α ∗ ∈ [0,1] such that
a.

The equilibrium level of education rises (or falls) with δ if α 0 ≤ α < α ∗
(or α ∗ < α ≤ 1 ).

b.

The equilibrium level of education falls (or rises) with u if 0 ≤ α < α ∗
(or α ∗ < α ≤ 1 ).
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Proof:
a.

N1
∂e ∗
=
where N 1 = g1 (1 − α )e − αg .
∂δ
−D
D = [(1 + c)(1 − α ) + g (2α − 1)]g11 + g1[(1 − α )φ '+ (2α − 1) g1 ] − αgφ"− αφ ' g1 ;
It is easy to check that for α = 0 , D > 0 and for α = 1 , D < 0. Since D is

continuous then there exists a α ∗ such that D(α = α * ) = 0. Therefore, for all 0 ≤ α < α ∗ ,
D > 0 and for all α ∗ < α ≤ 1 , D < 0.
Now, ( g1 (1 − α )e − αg )δ = − g1[αg + (1 − α )(1 + u − g )] .
If (1 + u − g ) > 0, then the numerator is clearly negative.
Now consider

N
∂e ∗
= 1
∂δ − D

Since the numerator is negative the sign of the above expression depends on the
sign of the denominator D . We have already shown that D is positive 0 ≤ α < α * for and
negative for α ∗ < α ≤ 1 .

∂e ∗
∂e ∗
∗
Therefore,
> 0 for all 0 ≤ α < α and
< o for all α ∗ < α ≤ 1 .
∂δ
∂δ
If (1 + u − g ) < 0 then we can show that there exists [α 0 ,1] 8 such that the above
result holds.9 Then we formally let the range of α to be defined by [0,1] ∩ [α 0 ,1] .

∂e ∗
N
b.
=
where N = (1 − α )( g1 ) and
∂u − D
D = [(1 + c)(1 − α ) + g (2α − 1)]g11 + g1[(1 − α )φ '+ (2α − 1) g1 ] − αgφ"− αφ ' g1 ;

8
9

If K 2 is sufficiently large and α ≠ 0 , then α 0 and is very close to zero.
The detail proof of this assertion is available from the authors on request.
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Since (1 − α )( g1 ) > 0 therefore the sign of

∂e
depends on the sign of D. Therefore, for all
∂u

0 ≤ α < α ∗ , D > 0 and for all α ∗ < α ≤ 1 , D < 0.

∂e ∗
N
∂e ∗
∂e ∗
∗
∗
Now,
=
. Thus for all 0 ≤ α < α ,
< 0 and for all α < α ≤ 1 ,
> 0.
∂u − D
∂u
∂u

Comment:
We first note that the family cares about total quality with different weights
attached to school enrollment and education. A rise in δ , tends to decrease the equilibrium
level of education. If more weight is attached to education, then reducing education is more
costly. As a result, the family sends fewer children to school and restores the loss in quality
by increasing education. If more weight is attached to school enrollment, then reducing the
number of children in school is more costly than reducing the level of education. Therefore
the family reduces the equilibrium level of education while sending more children to
school.
Suppose u increases. An increase in u , would tend to encourage the family to send
fewer children to school, i.e., child labor increases at the margin. As a result, total quality
falls. To restore the original level of quality, the family must then increase the level of
education. Notice that when more weight is attached to education, the family already has
chosen a high level of education to begin with; therefore increasing education at the margin
only increases the marginal disutility of education. Therefore, the family reduces the level
of education and restores the loss in quality by increasing school enrollment. However, if
more weight is attached to quantity, then a reduction in school enrollment reduces total
quality. Suppose that the family decides to reduce the level of education while keeping the
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same number of children at school. Since more weight is attached to quantity, a huge drop
in education is required to keep the same number of children in school. However that will
also reduce total quality. As a result, the family tries to restore total quality by increasing
the level of education while sending fewer children to school.

Proposition 2:

Fertility increases (or decreases) in response to a rise in u and δ

according as K12 is negative (or positive).
Proof: From equation (7) and (6) we note that n = n(e(u, δ , g ), α , u, g ) . Taking derivatives
with respect to u , we get

dn dn ∂e ∂n
=
+
du de ∂u ∂u
With a little bit of algebra it can be shown that

Therefore,

Now,

dn
=0
de

dn ∂n
=
du ∂u

N2
∂n
=
∂u − D1

N 2 = − K12 (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α α

∂LC
∂u

and D1 = K11 + K12α (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α (1 −
Now

∂LC
) − wV "(n)
∂n

∂LC
1
= 1− α
α −2
∂u
αg [ K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) − (n − LC ) α −1 K22 g 1−α α (n − LC ) α −1 ]

Algebraically D1 can be shown to be strictly negative if K is strictly concave.
Therefore,

− D1 is clearly positive.

∂LC
is positive because the numerator and the
∂u
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denominator are both positive. Therefore N 2 is positive (or negative) if K12 is negative
(or positive). Similarly,

N
dn
= 3 where
− D1
dδ

D1 = K11 + K12α (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α (1 −

N 3 = − K12 (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α α

∂LC
and
∂δ

∂LC
) − wV "(n) .
∂n

We already know that if K is strictly concave then D1 is negative. Therefore − D1
is clearly positive. Further,

∂LC
e
=
> 0.
1− α
α −2
∂δ αg [ K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) − (n − LC ) α −1 K22 g 1−α α (n − LC ) α −1 ]
Therefore, N 3 is positive (or negative) if K12 is negative (or positive).

Comment:
If the level of education is held constant, then an increase in the fixed cost of
education increases child labor at the margin. As child labor increases total quality falls. If

K12 is negative, then a fall in total quality must necessarily increase the marginal utility of
having children, as a result fertility rises. If K12 is positive, then a fall in total quality
reduces the marginal utility from having children, therefore fertility is reduced. The
intuition for increase in δ is similar.

Proposition 3: Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to
a)

an increase in u if α ∗ < α < 1 and K12 < 0 (or 0 ≤ α < α ∗ and K12 > 0).

b)

an increase in δ if α 0 < α < α ∗ and K12 < 0 ( or α ∗ < α < α 0 and K12 > 0)
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Proof: 10

LC = LC (n(e(u, g ), e(u, g ), u, g )

dLC ∂LC dn ∂e ∂n ∂LC ∂e ∂LC
=
(
+ )+
+
du
∂n de ∂u ∂u
∂e ∂u ∂u
As mentioned earlier,

dn
= 0. Therefore, the above expression boils down to
de

dLC ∂LC ∂n ∂LC ∂e ∂LC
=
+
+
.
du
∂n ∂u ∂e ∂u ∂u
Algebraically,

Now

We

have

already

shown

that

∂LC
is positive.
∂u

∂LC
can also be shown to be positive.
∂e

∂LC
K21 (n − LC ) α −1
= 1+
∂n
K2 (α − 1)(n − LC ) α − 2 + α (n − LC ) 2α − 2 g 1− α K22

It is easy to check that K2 (α − 1)(n − LC ) α − 2 + α (n − LC ) 2α − 2 g 1− α K22 < 0
The above expression can be simplified to
(n − LC ) α −1[ K21 + α (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α K22 − (1 − α ) K2 (n − LC ) −1 ]
[ K2 (α − 1)(n − LC ) α − 2 + (n − LC ) 2α − 2 K22 g 1− α α ]
Note that [ K21 + α (n − LC ) α −1 g 1− α K22 − (1 − α ) K2 (n − LC ) −1 ] < 0, if the cross effect is
dominated by the own effect. We assume that it is so. Hence

∂LC
> 0. Therefore,
∂n

dLC ∂LC ∂n ∂LC ∂e ∂LC
=
+
+
∂n ∂u ∂e ∂u ∂u
du
Now, if K12 > 0 then

∂LC ∂n
∂LC ∂e ∂LC
< 0. If 0 ≤ α < α ∗ then
+
can be shown to be
∂n ∂u
∂e ∂u ∂u

negative. Therefore, if K12 > 0 and 0 ≤ α < α ∗ then

10

The detailed proof is relegated to the appendix.
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dLC
< 0. Now, if K12 < 0 then
du

∂LC ∂n
∂LC ∂e ∂LC
> 0. Further, if α > α ∗ then
+
can be shown to be positive.
∂n ∂u
∂e ∂u ∂u
Therefore,

dLC
> 0.
du

The proof of part (b) of proposition (3) is somewhat similar and is omitted here for
brevity.11

Comment:
Suppose, K12 is negative and α > α ∗ holds. Notice in that case, a rise in u implies
a rise in education. Further, a rise in u also increases fertility. A rise in fertility and
education increases total quality. The rise in total quality increases the marginal disutility
of quality as a result child labor must increase. Now suppose that 0 < α < α ∗ and K12 is
positive. A rise in u then reduces education and fertility. This reduces total quality
thereby reducing the marginal disutility of quality. As a result child labor decreases.
Now consider a rise in the marginal cost of education. Suppose first that

α 0 < α < α ∗ holds and K12 < 0. Then a rise in the marginal cost ( δ ) increases both
education and fertility. This increases quality thereby increasing the marginal disutility of
quality; as a result child labor must increase. If α ∗ < α < α 0 and K12 < 0, then an increase
in the marginal cost of education leads to a fall in the level of education as well as fertility.
The decrease in quality decreases the marginal disutility of quality; therefore child labor
must decrease.

11

The detail proof of part (b) is relegated to the appendix.
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Note that for a wide range of parameter values, [α 0 , α 0 ] , lump sum subsidies and
marginal subsidies work in opposite directions, provided that the effect of education
subsidies on fertility are sufficiently small, which is likely to hold in reality. This explains
why Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) find that in Ghana, a rise in the cost of education
increases both the probability of work and probability of schooling. Further, we note that
the magnitude of marginal subsidies may be greater, equal or lesser than that of a lump
sum subsidy. Suppose for a given α , the cost of schooling increases. This increase is
likely to incorporate both the fixed and the marginal component of cost. As we have seen,
that one of them tends to increase child labor while the other reduces it. Whether child
labor decreases or increases depends on the relative strength of these two effects. This
explains why one might see child labor decreasing in response to a rise in cost of schooling
as Cartwright (1999) finds in Columbia and increase in others as Cartwright and Patrinos
(1999) find in Bolivia. This also explains why PROGRESA, has been only modestly
successful in reducing child labor since it contains elements of both a lump sum subsidy as
well as marginal subsidy.

2.3 Conclusion
We analyze the role of education subsidies on child labor where a family chooses
both fertility and the education attainment of children. Parents are assumed to care about
the quantity of children as well as total quality, but attach different weights to school
enrollment and the level of education. We find that, for a wide range of parameter values,
if more weight is given to quality then an increase in the lump sum cost reduces education,
whereas an increase in the marginal cost of education increases education. Further, we also
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underline conditions, in which increases in lump sum and marginal education costs
increase (or decrease) fertility and child labor. We feel that a detailed empirical study is
necessary to evaluate the education policies pursued by different countries in directions our
model suggests. This will help to implement more fruitful and effective education policies
in the future.
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Mathematical Appendix :
We outline a detailed proof of part (a) and (b) of Proposition 3
a) Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to an increase in u if α ∗ < α < 1
and K12 < 0 (or 0 < α < α ∗ and K12 > 0).
We prove part (a) of proposition 3 in two parts, (i) and (ii).
(i) If 0 ≤ α < α ∗ then

∂LC ∂e ∂LC
+
can be shown to be negative.
∂e ∂u ∂u

(ii) If α ∗ < α < 1 then

∂LC ∂e ∂LC
+
can be shown to be positive.
∂e ∂u ∂u

i)

Let

N 1 ∂LC ∂e ∂LC
=
+
∂e ∂u ∂u
D1

N1
{µe − (n − LC ) 2α −1 K 22 (1 − α ) g − α g1} g1 (1 − α )αg 1−α − D
=
D1 ( − D)αg 1− α {K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α − 2 − (n − LC ) 2α − 2 K 22 g 1−α α}
Solving for the sign of the numerator, we g

N 1 = {µe − (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) g − α g1 }g1 (1 − α )αg 1−α − D
(1 − α ) 2 µg1
= {
− (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) g − α g1 }g1 (1 − α )αg 1− α
αg
− [(1 + c − g )(1 − α ) + αg ]g11 − [(1 − α )(δ − g1 ) + αg1 ]g1 + αδg1
(1 − α ) 3
(1 + C − g )( g1 ) 2 − α (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) 2 g 1− 2α ( g1 ) 2
= αg
− {(1 + C − g )(1 − α ) + αg}g11 − {(1 − α )(δ − g1 ) + αg1 }g1 + αδg1

After some algebra the expression above boils down to
(δ − g1 ) g11
1
[(1 − α ) 2 (δ − g1 ) gg1 − α (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) 2 g 2 − 2α ( g1 ) 2 − αg 2
g1
=g
− αg 2 g11 − g (1 − α )(δ − g1 ) g1 − αg ( g1 ) 2 + αgδg1
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=

(δ − g1 )
1 2
[α (δ − g1 ) gg1 − α (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) 2 g 2 − 2α ( g1 ) 2 − αg 2
g11
g
g1
− αg 2 g11 ] > 0

The expression

N1
can be simplified to
D1

(δ − g1 ) gg1α (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) 2 g 2 − 2α ( g1 ) 2 − g 2 (δ − g1 ) g11 ( g1 ) −1 − g 2 g11
g 2 − α [ K22 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α − 2 − (n − LC ) 2α − 2 K22 g 1− α α ]( − D)
The numerator is positive from above. The denominator is positive for ∀ α ∈ [0, α ∗ ) . If

K12 > 0 then child labor rises with respect to a rise in u .
The second part follows easily from the first. We note that the numerator ( N 1 ) is
still positive; the denominator ( D1 ) however is negative for ∀ α ∈ (α ∗ ,1) because D is
positive for ∀ α ∈ (α ∗ ,1) . If K12 < 0 the child ambiguously falls with respect to u
a) Child labor increases (or decreases) in response to an increase in δ if α 0 < α < α ∗
and K12 < 0 (or α ∗ < α < α 0 and K12 > 0).
We know that

∂LC ∂e ∂LC
+
∂e ∂δ ∂δ

is positive whenever

α 0 < α < α ∗ ). We need to show that
solve for the expression
explicit

expression

∂LC ∂e ∂LC
+
< 0 for ( α ∗ < α < α 0 ). As before we
∂e ∂δ ∂δ

∂LC ∂e ∂LC
+
.
∂e ∂δ ∂δ
for

∂e
> 0 (it holds for
∂δ

the

Let,

N 2 ∂LC ∂e ∂LC
=
+
. Plugging in the
D2 ∂e ∂δ ∂δ

partials

and

a

little

algebra

yields:
N 2 = (1 − α )(δ − g1 )( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) − α (n − LC ) 2α −1 K22 (1 − α ) 1− 2α ( g1 (1 − α )e − αg )
− e{(1 + C)(1 − α ) + g (2α − 1)}g11 − e{(1 − α )δ + (2α − 1) g1 )} g1 + eαδg1
and D2 = ( − D)αg 1− α {K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α − 2 − (n − LC ) 2α − 2 K22 g 1− α α}
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We observe that for α = α ∗ , N 2 < 0 and for α = 1 , N 2 > 0. Since N 2 is continuous in

α to the right of α ∗ then there exists a α 0 such that for α ∈ (α ∗α 0 ] , N 2 < 0.
Since D2 is positive for α ∈ (α ∗α 0 ] we have that

N2
< 0. If K12 > 0 then child labor
D2

We have so far assumed that g1 (1 − α )e − αg < 0, we

falls with respect to a rise in δ

now show that under a very general assumption it is likely to hold. We prove this result as
Lemma 1.

Lemma 1: We need to show that ( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) < 0.
Proof: Suppose that 1 + u − g > 0 .
We have

∂e g1 (1 − α )e − αg
=
∂δ
D

If 1 + u − g > 0 then ( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) < 0, then

∂e
∂e
> 0 for α 0 < α < α ∗ and
< 0 if
∂δ
∂δ

α ∗ < α < 1 . However, if 1 + u − g < 0 holds, then, the sign of ( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) becomes
ambiguous. We proceed as follows: we assume g is not sufficiently small so that 1 + u − g
is not too negative.12 For α = 1 ,

( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) >0. Since

( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) < 0 and if

α = 0 then

( g1 (1 − α )e − αg ) is continuous then there exist an

α~ ∈ [0,1] s.t g1 (1 − α )e − αg = 0 . If g is not too large in the sense noted above, then, it is

12

This assumption is likely to hold in reality. If g were sufficiently large then the problem
of child labor will not persist because the returns to education in the future are
sufficiently high for parents to withdraw children from work and send them to school.
Empirical evidence suggests that it is indeed the case, in most third world countries where
child labor persists the return to education is very low.
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easy to show that α~ < α ∗ . Further, we can show that for ∀ α > α~ g 1 (1 − α )e − αg < 0 ,
if g is close to 1 + u , then α~ = α 0 is close to 0.
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Chapter 3
Endogenous Fertility, Child labor and Optimal Tariffs

Abstract
This paper looks at the effect of trade liberalization on child labor in the context of both a
small and a large country. We first analyze the effect of trade liberalization on child labor and
fertility with respect to a small country. We show that tariffs may increase (or decrease) child labor
and fertility depending on the slope of the labor supply curve and the type of equilibrium (high or
low fertility). For a large country, fertility and child labor may qualitatively and quantitatively
alter the effect of tariffs on the terms of trade. We find that in some cases, a rise in the tariff may
deteriorate the terms of trade (starting from a zero tariff) and therefore an import subsidy may be
optimal.

JEL Classification: O10; J24; F16
Keywords: Child Labor; Endogenous Fertility; Optimal Trade Taxes.
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3.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades there has been a huge proliferation in the number of
preferential agreements (PTAs) in the world, involving both developed and less developed
countries. Recently the issue of child labor has also featured prominently in global
discussions. So far as tariffs affect household income through changes in factor rewards
and consequently on labor supply decisions, bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization and
Preferential Trading Agreements involving reduction in tariff barriers impact the incidence
of child labor and fertility.
Following the threat of trade sanctions, suspension of GSP13 privileges, most
countries are aggressively adopting policies to reduce the incidence of child labor. The
focus of the literature on child labor has been to outline the causes and consequences of
child labor. Basu and Van (1998) show that parents in less developed countries send their
children to work not because of a lack of parental consciousness but due to necessity. The
labor market may be characterized by multiple equilibria. In the bad equilibrium wages are
low and therefore parents send their children to work, in the good equilibrium wages are
high and consequently the same parents do not send their children to work. A ban on child
labor merely shocks the economy from a bad to a good equilibrium. Baland and Robinson
(2000) show that child labor arises because of zero bequests arising out of poverty or
imperfect or non–existent capital markets despite parental altruism. They show that if
general equilibrium effects are well behaved then a small ban on child labor may bring
about a Pareto improvement. An endogenous change in the wage induced by the reduction
in child labor may make parents and firms better off.

13

Generalized System of Preference.
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Ranjan (2001) develops an overlapping generations model to analyze the impact of
trade sanctions on child labor. He shows that child labor arises due to credit constraints. It
also derives a positive relation between inequality in income distribution to the incidence
of child labor. Further, he is the first to show that trade sanctions against countries which
harbor child labor may fail to reduce the incidence of child labor.
Jafferey and Lahiri (2002) examine the interaction between credit markets, trade
sanctions and the incidence of child labor. They show that both poverty and poor quality of
education are important determinants of child labor. The incidence of child labor decreases
as access to credit becomes easier. Further, trade sanctions may actually increase the
incidence of child labor, especially among poor households when access to credit is poor.
The possibility diminishes as access to credit is improved.
Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2003) in a general equilibrium model, show
that the effect of the terms of trade on child labor depends critically on the pattern of
substitutability (or complementarity) in excess demand functions. The effect of terms of
trade on income distribution depends critically on whether the terms of trade change
happens in the present or the future. They show that rather than using trade sanctions a
more effective policy would be to persuade developing nations to tax the education of
skilled households and use the revenues to subsidize the education of unskilled households.
The role of fertility has not received the attention it deserves. We believe that
fertility decisions ought to be a key feature in any discussion about child labor. Given that
child labor arises because of poverty, low human capital accumulation of parents and zero
savings, parents are more likely to endogenise their decision on how many children to
have. In many developing countries children are the only source of support to the old. For
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instance in countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially among the poor, older
people co-reside with their children.
Our focus in the first part of the paper is to see the effect of tariffs (with respect to a
small country) on fertility and the incidence of child labor. We find that for a small open
economy, tariffs may increase (decrease) fertility depending on whether the economy is
characterized by high fertility (low fertility) equilibrium as well as the slope of the labor
supply function. Child labor surely goes up in the high fertility equilibrium in response to
an increase in wages given that the labor supply function is positively sloped. We also
underline the conditions, under which the labor supply curve is positively sloped. This is of
interest because of the recent proliferation in the number of preferential trading agreements
in the world. The reduction in tariffs, following a PTA or MTL, will in most cases alter the
factor rewards and in some cases may also bring about a change in terms of trade. Most
WTO members are also involved in bilateral trading agreements. For instance PTAs like
ASEAN, MERCOSUR and ATPA are among developing countries harboring child labor.14
Also multilateral trade negotiations through the WTO, albeit slowly, are under way. Thus
the issue of trade liberalization is of major concern in terms of its effects on child labor.
A related issue is to inspect the effect of tariffs on terms of trade in a large country
framework when fertility decisions are endogenous and child labor practices exist. The
literature on optimal trade policy suggests that for a large country a positive tariff barrier
may improve its welfare through the terms of trade effect. The idea is that a large country
solely concerned with national interest should restrict trade so as to exploit its market
power. We analyze the role of tariffs in a large country general equilibrium frame work in
the context of endogenous fertility and the presence of child labor. Bhagwati (1958) shows
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that growth which expands a country’s exports can lower its welfare (immiserizing
growth) through a large deterioration in the terms of trade. In a following paper Bhagwati
(1968) shows model growth cannot be immiserizing if an optimal tariff is imposed.
The adverse terms of trade effect, resulting from the growth of the export sector can
be corrected by imposing a tariff on the importable. In his model, tariffs do not by
themselves affect the growth of factors of production; in our model the growth in the factor
of production is endogenous through the effect of tariffs on factor rewards. We find that in
the context of a large open economy, tariffs may deteriorate the terms of trade under some
conditions, in a situation where fertility is endogenous and child labor practices are at
force.15 In that case the optimal tariff turns out to be negative, i.e. an import subsidy is
optimal.
Further, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped then the optimal tariff, in the
presence of endogenous fertility and child labor, may be higher or lower than the tariff in
place. Optimal tariffs, which neglect the effect of endogenous fertility and the presence of
child labor, may impose significant losses in welfare from the tariff imposing country’s
perspective. We present the small open economy case in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents
the case of a large open economy. Conclusions follow in section 3.4.

3.2 A small open economy
In this section the issue of child labor and endogenous fertility is analyzed in the
context of a small open economy. We borrow the basic setup from Bandyopadhyay and
Roy (2003). The economy is characterized by a representative unskilled household There
14

Singapore and Chile are notable exceptions.
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are two goods in the economy, A and M . A is the numeraire. Good M is imported while
good A is exported. Since the economy is small, the household takes the prices of goods
as given. The government imposes a tariff ‘ t ’ on the import. The government redistributes
the tariff revenue to the representative household, via lump sum transfers, R . The price of
good A is normalized to unity, therefore the effective price of good M is PM + t . The
capital and land used in production is also owned by the household.
The household is endowed with one unit of adult labor. Utility depends on the
consumption of goods A and M , the number of children born to the family, the number of
children going to school as well as the educational attainment of each child attending
school. The utility of the household is given by U ( A, M , n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) ; where A
and M denote the consumption of the goods in question. The number of children in the
family is given by n ; g (e, g ) is the stock of human capital (‘quality’) per child going to
school which is a function of education ‘ e ’. g may be interpreted as a factor, which
enhances the transformation of education into human capital, which could be quality of
schooling or endowment of talent in children. The weights α and 1- α

reflects the

importance parents attach to the number of children going to school and the quality of
children in school respectively. Children sent to school however receive the same level of
education.
Children who do not attend school are assumed to be endowed with one unit of
human capital, i.e., g (0, g ) = 1 . We follow Becker and Lewis (1973) and assume that the
household cares about the quantity and the quality of children with one exception. In their
model they assume that all children are of the same quality and parents do not make any
15

The cocoa producing countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Brazil have some market power and also
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distinction among their children. This assumption is relaxed; it is assumed that although
parents care about the number of children born to the family they may or may not view all
children as being the same in terms of their choices, i.e., the household may send some
children to school and some to work (though nothing hinges on this).
This allows one to entertain the possibilities where all children are sent to school,
all children are sent to work and some are sent to school while the rest go to work. The
first and the second possibility are corner solutions and therefore are of limited interest in
the analysis because marginal changes in policy responses will have no effect on them.
Only the third possibility is of interest, where the family makes decisions at the margin,
how many children to have, how many to sent to school, etc. The utility function is
assumed to be separable in the consumption goods as well as the quality and the quantity
of children. Further, the household is assumed to have quasi-linear preferences over A
and M . The utility function is given by
U ( M , n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) = u( M ) + A + K (n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) ; α ∈ [0,1] (1)
The utility function K (.) embodies the satisfaction of the household from having n
children, the number of children sent to school as well as the quality of children sent to
school. Where (n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α is the total quality gained from sending (n − LC )
children to school each acquiring human capital g (e, g ) through education. We assume
K(.) is twice differentiable and strictly concave with K2 > 0, K22 < 0 and K11 < 0. Further
we assume that K1 can also be negative in equilibrium. This assumption captures the
congestion effect with respect to the number of children born to the family. As the number
of children increases, parental responsibility increases which may create a disutility from
employ children in the production of cocoa.
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having more children. A large number of children also require greater commitment in
terms of time, which may reduce utility at the margin. Too many children also imply a
higher degree of rivalry in domestic consumption, which reduces the utility from having
more children. We also assume that g1 > 0, g11 < 0, g 2 > 0, g 22 < 0 and g12 > 0. Quality
increases in response to education at a decreasing rate. Exactly similar results obtain for
school quality.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following budget constraint
( PM + t ) M + A = [ w{1 − C(e)(n − LC ) − V (n)}] + wLC + wg (e, g )(n − LC ) +
rK K + rT T + R

(2)

The left hand side represents the expenditure on goods M and A respectively. The
right hand side represents income of the household. w is the wage rate. C(e)(n − LC ) is
the total cost of educating (n − LC ) children. The cost of education C (e) is assumed to be
increasing and convex.

LC is the number of children who go to work forgoing the option of going to
school. V (n) is the cost of bringing up children, which we call ‘rearing cost’. We assume
V (.) is increasing and convex. The education and rearing costs are measured in units of

labor time.
The first term in the right hand side is the income from adult labor net of the
rearing cost and the wages foregone in educating children. The second term reflects the
income from child labor. To make the analyses simple we do not allow for the possibility
of combining work and school.16 We assume that a child born to a family can either go to
school or work. The third term reflects the earnings of children who become skilled adults.
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The fourth and fifth term on the right hand side reflect the income received by the
household from ownership of capital. The last term is the lump sum tariff revenue on
imports redistributed to the household. The first order conditions of the maximization
exercise yields
1- λ =0

(3)

u'( M ) − λ ( PM + t ) = 0

(4)

K1 + K2α (n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) 1− α + wg (e, g ) = wV '(n) + wC(e)

(5)

K 2 (1 − α )(n − LC )α −1 g −α g1 = w(δ − g1 )

(6)

wC (e) + w ≥ wg (e, g ) + K 2α (n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) 1− α

(7)

Equation

(3)

λ

gives

=

1.

Equation

(6)

implicitly

defines LC = LC (n, e, w,..) . Plugging this back to equation (6), we get n = n(e, w,..) .
Rearranging equation (5), we get:
K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) − α g1 = w(φ ' (e) − g1 )

(6)

Plugging this in equation (7), we get:
w{C (e) + 1 − g (e, g )} =

w(φ ' (e) − g1 ) g (e, g )
(1 − α ) g1

(7)′

Substituting the expression from equation (7) in equation (5), we get the following
equation:
K1 (n,(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) 1−α ) = wV '(n) − w

(8)

Equation (5) gives us the optimal number of children in the family. The left hand
side represents the marginal benefit from increasing fertility whereas the right hand side

16

Our results are qualitatively unaltered if we instead assumed that all children can combine work and
school.
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represents the cost of increasing fertility. The change in utility in response to change in
fertility is given by K1 + K2α (n − LC ) α −1 g (e, g ) 1− α . The wages earned by the marginal
child as a skilled adult is given by wg (e, g ) . The total cost of bringing up and educating the
marginal child, is captured by wC (e) + wV ' (n) . In equilibrium, we must have that the
marginal benefit from increasing fertility should be equal to the marginal cost.
Equation (6) gives us the optimal level of education. The left hand side represents
the marginal benefit from increase in quality and the right hand side reflects the cost of
doing so. The change in wages earned by the children as skilled adults in response to a unit
change in the level of education is given by w(n − LC ) g1 (e, g ). The satisfaction received by
the parent due to the change in quality in response to a change in education is given by
K2 (1 − α )(n − LC ) α g (e, g ) − α g1 . The right hand side represents the rise in cost in response

to a unit increase in the level of education captured by w(n − LC )φ '(e) . In equilibrium the
marginal benefit and the cost must balance each other.
Equation (7) gives us the optimal level of child labor from the perspective of the
family. The left hand side represents the opportunity cost of sending a child to school and
the right hand side represents the gains from education and the increase in satisfaction from
not sending a child to work. If it holds with strict inequality then all children are sent to
work and marginal changes in policy have no effect on parents’ decision to send a child to
work. Therefore we focus on the case where the equation holds with equality so that
changes in policy have some effect on child labor and fertility decisions. The equilibrium
level of education, fertility, child labor and consumption of M are obtained recursively as
follows. Given w , u , PM , g , t the equilibrium level of education, e ∗ is obtained from (7).
Equation (6) implicitly defines LC = LC (n, e, w, u, g ) . Using this in equation (5), we
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get n = n(e, w, u, g ) . Plugging e ∗ in (5), gives us the equilibrium level of fertility n ∗ .
Plugging e ∗ and n ∗ in equation (6), gives us the optimal level of child labor LC ∗ . The
equilibrium level of M and A is obtained from equation (3) and (4).

Production:
Now we turn to production. We assume that goods A and M are produced using
Production of A requires adult unskilled labor, child labor and

CRS technology.

capital T , while production of M requires adult unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital
K . Note that child labor is used only in the production of A . Since the economy is small,

output prices are determined exogenously. Given the output prices and the tariff rate, the
wage rate is determined by supply and demand in the labor market. We assume that
producers maximize their profits. We derive the labor demand function from the profit
maximizing conditions. Producers of A maximize the following:

π A = A(l A , T ) − wl A − rT T

(8)"

where l A is the total amount of unskilled labor used in the production process. This yields
the labor demand function l A = l A ( w, T , τ A )

(9)

Similarly producers of M maximize profits which is given by

π M = ( PM + t ) M (l M , K ) − wl M − rK K

(10)

Profit maximization yields l M = l M ( w, PM + t , K , τ M )

(11)

where τ A ,

τM

represents

technology

associated

and M respectively.
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with

the

production

of

A

The total demand for labor is therefore l M ( w, PM + t , K , τ M ) + l A ( w, T , τ A ) . Now,
we turn to supply of labor. Let LS denote the labor supply, which is given by
LS ( w) =

{1 − C (e)(n( w,..) − LC ( w,..) − V (n( w))} + LC ( w,..) + g (e, g )(n( w) − LC ( w,..)) ;

where the first term within brackets represents the amount of adult unskilled labor supplied
by the household. The second and the third term reflect the amount child labor and skilled
labor supplied respectively. Note from the first order conditions of utility maximization,
fertility and child labor is functions of the wage rate. Therefore the wage rate is determined
by equating the demand and supply of labor as given below
l M ( w, PM + t , K , τ M ) + l A ( w, T , τ A ) = LS ( w)

(12)

This implicitly defines w = w( PM , t , T , K , τ A , τ M ,..)

(13)

Definition: We say that the economy is in a high fertility equilibrium if K1 is negative

and in a low fertility equilibrium if it is positive. We state results 1 and 2 without proof.17

Result 1:

a) If K12 is positive (or negative) and large then dn dw < 0 (or >0).
b) If K12 is either positive or negative and sufficiently small, then dn dw < 0 in a
low fertility equilibrium.
c) If K12 is either negative or positive and sufficiently small, then dn dw > 0 in a
high fertility equilibrium.

17

The proofs are trivial and therefore omitted.
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Comment:

Suppose that K12 is sufficiently large and positive. A rise in wages increases child
labor at the margin thereby reducing total quality. The reduction in quality must reduce the
marginal utility of children, as a result fertility decreases. Now suppose that K12 is
sufficiently small. Then fertility increases (decreases) depending on whether 1 − V '(n ) is
positive (negative). Notice that 1 − V '(n ) = − K1 . Then whether 1 − V '(n ) is positive
or negative depends on whether K1 is negative or positive. If it is positive then we have
equilibrium with low fertility and if it is negative then we have high fertility equilibrium.
This means that effect of wages on fertility depends on the nature of the equilibrium. If the
equilibrium is characterized by low fertility then a rise in the wage rate reduces fertility
whereas the opposite result holds otherwise. The intuition behind this result is simple, if
rearing cost of additional children is less than what these children earn as child labor, then
fertility is increased. The intuitions for the other cases are similar.

Result 2:

Child labor unambiguously increases in response to an increase in wages in the
high fertility equilibrium if K12 is negative or positive and sufficiently small.

Comment:

From our first order conditions, we note that wages do not affect the optimal choice
of education. A rise in the wage increases fertility (in a high fertility equilibrium). The
increase in fertility must increase total quality, as a result marginal disutility of quality
increases. Therefore child labor is increased. Mukhopadhyay (1994) analyzes the impact of
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green revolution on fertility as well as child schooling. He finds that the rise in income due
to the adoption of new technology was being invested in larger families. Also rise in
income in the late 19th century saw a rapid fall in fertility in England. Thus our model is
consistent with the finding that wages increase fertility in some cases and decreases it in
others.

Proposition 1: The labor supply function is positively sloped if either

a) K21 is negative or positive and sufficiently small and the economy is in a high
fertility equilibrium, or
b) K21 is positive or negative and sufficiently small and the economy is in a low
fertility equilibrium.
Proof:
a) If

K21 is negative or positive and sufficiently small then (

dn dLC
−
) is
dw dw

negative.18
dLC
dn
dn dLC
dLS
= ( g (e, g ) − C(e))(
−
)+
− V ' ( n)
dw
dw dw
dw
dw

If the economy is in the high fertility equilibrium then
V ' (n)

dn
dn
dn
<
(since V ' (n) <1 and
>0)
dw
dw
dw

Consider ( g (e, g ) − C (e))(

dL
dn dLC
dn
−
)+ ( C −
)
dw dw
dw dw

= ( g (e, g ) − C (e) − 1)(

18

dn dLC
−
)
dw dw

The proof of this assertion is trivial and therefore relegated to the appendix to facilitate exposition.
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From the first order conditions ( g (e, g ) − C (e) − 1) ≤ 0
( g (e, g ) − C (e) − 1)(

⇒ ( g (e, g ) − C(e))(

dn dLC
−
)≥ 0
dw dw

dL
dn
dn dLC
−
) + C − V '(n)
>0
dw
dw dw
dw

dLS
⇒
> 0.
dw

Similarly it is easy to show that in a low fertility equilibrium, (

dn dLC
−
) < 0 if K21 is
dw dw

either positive or negative and sufficiently small.
Consider, ( g (e, g ) − C (e))(
= ( g (e, g ) − C (e))(

dL
dn dLC
dn
−
) + C − V '(n)
dw dw
dw
dw

dL
dn
dn dLC
dn
−
)+ C −
− (V ' (n) − 1)
dw
dw dw
dw dw

= ( g (e, g ) − C(e) − 1)(

( g (e, g ) − C (e) − 1)(

Also −

dn dLC
dn
−
) − (V '(n) − 1)
dw dw
dw

dn dLC
−
) >0
dw dw

dn
dLS
(V '(n) − 1) > 0.Therefore
is positive.
dw
dw

Comment:

We first consider the high fertility equilibrium. If K21 is negative or positive and
sufficiently small, then a rise in wages reduces school enrollment. Since the level of
education does not change, a reduction in school enrolment must necessarily reduce the
cost of education in terms of adult labor time. Child labor rises as well. On the other hand,
adult labor supply goes down due to higher fertility, because rearing costs go up. However,
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this increase in the supply of labor more than compensates the fall. Therefore, labor supply
goes up.
Now, consider low fertility equilibrium, since K21 is either positive or negative and
sufficiently small, school enrollment falls. This frees up adult labor time, since the cost of
education goes down. Lower fertility, also frees up time because of lower rearing costs.
The resulting increase in the supply of labor, more than compensates a fall in child labor, if
any, leading to an increase in the supply of labor.

Proposition 2: The labor supply function is negatively sloped if

a) |( g (e) − c(e) − 1)(

dn dLC
dn
−
)| > |(1 − V '(n))
| and either
dw
dw dw

b) K21 is positive and large in a high fertility equilibrium, or
c) K21 is negative and large in a low fertility equilibrium.

Proof:
The proof is similar to the one outlined in proposition 1.

Comment:

Suppose that the economy is in a high fertility equilibrium. If K21 is positive and
large then (

dn dLC
−
) is positive. To see this, note that a rise in the wage rate increases
dw dw

child labor at the margin, as a result total quality falls. Therefore, the marginal utility of
quality rises. Further, a rise in fertility also increases the marginal utility of quality. As a
result, school enrollment increases. Similar results obtain for the case of low fertility. Now,
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since school enrollment increases, adult labor supply must fall. Increase in fertility, also
reduces supply of adult labor. However, child labor supply increases. If condition a) is
satisfied, then the fall in adult labor supply, outweighs the rise in child labor, thereby
reducing the total supply of labor. The intuition behind the other case is similar.

Proposition 3: If either condition a) or b) in proposition 1 holds then increasing tariffs or

the capital stock ( K ) increases wages.

Proof:
Consider an increase in tariffs. From equation (12) and (13) we know that the
wage rate is implicitly defined as a function of tariffs. Using the implicit function theorem
we obtain
−

dw
=
dt

lM2
dLS
l M 1 + l A1 −
dw

The numerator is clearly positive. The denominator is unambiguously negative if
dLS
dLS
is positive. If either condition a) or b) in proposition 2 is met then
is positive.
dw
dw

Therefore

dw
is positive. The proof of the second part is similar.
dt

Comment:

An increase in the tariff induces the firms to hire more labor, so the labor demand
curve shifts out. If the supply curve is positively sloped, then this must increase wages.
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Similarly, a rise in the capital stock increases the demand for labor. If the supply of labor is
positively sloped, then the wage rate rises.

Proposition 4: If condition a) and either b) or c) of proposition 2 hold then increasing

tariffs or the capital stock ( K ) reduces the wage rate provided that the slope of the supply
curve is flatter than the slope of the total labor demand curve.
Proof:
dLS
dw
> 0 then clearly, −
=
If l M 1 + l A1 −
dw
dt

lM2
dLS
l M 1 + l A1 −
dw

> 0.

Comment:

A rise in the tariff rate increases the demand for labor. If the supply curve is
negatively sloped, then the increase in the demand reduces the wage rate, provided the
absolute slope of the supply curve is greater than that of the total demand curve.19 If this
condition is not met then wages rise even if the supply curve is negatively sloped.

Proposition 5: If condition a) or b) of proposition 1 holds then in response to an increase

in tariffs,
a)

Child labor and fertility increase in a high fertility equilibrium

b)

Fertility is decreased for sure in the low fertility equilibrium; the effect on

child labor is ambiguous.
Proof:
Combining proposition 3 and result 1 and 2 completes the proof.
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Comment:

Proposition 1 state conditions under which the labor supply function is positively
sloped. With a positively sloped labor supply curve, an increase in the tariff rate increases
the demand for labor, thereby pushing wages up. In high fertility equilibrium, higher
wages imply higher fertility and higher child labor. However, in a low fertility equilibrium,
higher wages reduce fertility. The effect on child labor is ambiguous. On one hand, the
increase in wages increases the opportunity cost of schooling. On the other hand, a fall in
fertility reduces total quality; therefore, parents would want to send more children to
school by taking them out of work. Child labor rises or falls, depending on the relative
strength of these two effects.

3.3 A large open economy

In this section we use the model described in section 3.2, except that we relax the
price taker assumption, that is, now the country is assumed to have some market power.
We analyze the impact of tariff on the terms of trade, given that fertility is endogenous and
the household can send its children to work. We use the duality approach, to find the terms
of trade effects as well as the optimal tariff. Since the country in question exports A , we
use A as superscript to denote the tariff imposing country while the rest of the world
carries the superscript M . The expenditure function and the revenue functions are
E A ( PM + t ,1,U A ) = R A ( PM + t ,1, LS ) + t ( E1A − R1A )

(14)

E M ( PM ,1, U M ) = R M ( PM ,1)

(15)

E1A ( PM + t ,1,U A ) + E1M ( PM ,1,U M ) = R1A ( PM + t ,1, LS ) + R1M ( PM ,1)

(16)

19

We use the term strongly negative henceforth to mean that the slope of the supply curve in absolute terms
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Equation (14) gives us the expenditure revenue function identity for the good A
exporting nation. Equation (15) gives us the same for the rest of the world. Equation (16)
gives us the supply of good M in the world market. By Walras’ law, we only need the
goods market equilibrium condition for a single market.
Equation (14) implicitly defines U A = U A ( PM , t , LS )

(14)´

Similarly equation (15) implicitly defines;
U M = U M ( PM )

(15)´

Plugging them back in equation (16) yields equation (16)′ below:
E1A ( PM + t ,1,U A ( PM , t , LS )) + E1M ( PM ,1,U M ( PM )) = R1A ( PM + t ,1, LS ) + R1M ( PM ,1) (16)´

From the previous section recall that LS = LS ( w( PM , t ,..)) . To avoid cluttering in notation
we write the labor supply as L and PM as P .
Therefore, equation (16)´ implicitly defines P = P(t )

(17)

To find the effect of change in tariffs we use the implicit function theorem, which yields

dP
−
=
dt

∂w
∂w
− R11A − R1AL Lw
∂t
∂t
w
∂
∂w
− R11M + E1AU U LA Lw
− R1AL Lw
∂P
∂P

E11A + E1AU U tA + E1AU U LA Lw
E11A + E1AU U PA − R11A + E11M + E1MU U PM

The denominator is the slope of the excess demand function, and hence we require it to be
negative for stability. The numerator can be rearranged as,
N= ( E11A + E1AU U tA − R11A ) + ( E1AU U LA − R1AL ) Lw
reduces to E11A − R11A − R1AL Lw

∂w
. Now, E1AU = 0, therefore, the numerator
∂t

∂w
∂w
. Since, R1AL > 0, then E11A − R11A − R1AL Lw
is clearly
∂t
∂t

is greater than the slope of the combined labor demand curve.
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negative provided Lw
However, if

Lw

∂w
dP
is positive. In that case, the sign of
turns out to be negative.
∂t
dt

∂w
dP
is negative, then the sign of
may turn out to be positive, if
dt
∂t

| E11A − R11A | < | R1AL Lw

∂w
|.
∂t

Further, we check the conditions, under which the optimal tariff is negative, given
that the labor supply curve is negatively sloped (we formally require Lw

∂w
∂w
and Lw
∂t
∂P

dU A
|t=0. After some tedious algebra we can show that,
to be negative). We evaluate
dt

∂w
R1A − E1A + 2 R LA Lw
w
∂
∂P ) +
( R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw
)(
A
A
∂t
EU
dU
|t=0 =
∂w
dt
2 R LA Lw
∂t ( E A − R A + E M − R M + E M U M − R A L ∂w )
A
P
11
11
11
11
1u
1L w
∂P
EU
The possibility of an import subsidy only arises when | E11A − R11A | < | R1AL Lw

Lw

∂w
∂w
is negative. Therefore we assume that ( R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw
) < 0. We also know
∂t
∂t

that

(

∂w
| and
∂t

R LA

> 0. Now, given

R1A − E1A + 2 R LA Lw
EUA

Lw

∂w
∂t

< 0, the optimal tariff is negative if

∂w
∂P ) is positive and if |θ | < |ϑ | .

Where θ = (E11A − R11A + E11M − R11M + E1Mu U PM

∂w
A
2R
L
L
w
∂w
∂t
− R1AL Lw
)
A
∂P
EU
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∂w
A
A
A
R
E
R
L
2
−
+
L
w
1
1
∂w
∂P ) .
)(
and ϑ = ( R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw
∂t
EUA
Proposition 6: An increase in tariffs

a) improves the terms of trade if the labor supply curve is positively sloped
b) deteriorates the terms of trade if the labor supply curve is negatively sloped20 and if
| E11A − R11A | < | R1AL Lw

∂w
|.
∂t

Proof: Obvious.

Comment:

A rise in the tariff increases the domestic price of the import, thereby reducing
demand. On the other the domestic supply increases, because a rise in wages increases the
supply of labor. Thus the fall in the demand, coupled with the increase in supply, reduces
the price of the import and improves the terms of trade. Now consider a negatively sloped
labor supply curve. A rise in the tariff would reduce the demand of the import
domestically. However, a rise in the tariff increases wages, but reduces the supply of labor
provided; the labor supply curve is not strongly negative. A fall in the supply of labor
contracts the domestic supply of the import. If this contraction in supply is sharp then the
price of the import rises thereby deteriorating the terms of trade.
Note that increase in the domestic supply of the import good, may influence the
optimal tariff, in the presence of child labor and endogenous fertility. In other words, the
endogenous change in the supply of labor may quantitative change the optimal tariff.

20

In the Heckscher-Ohlin model the possibility of an import subsidy arises even when the labor supply curve
is positively sloped.
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We take up this issue next. Note that from equation (14)′ we can
express U A = U A ( P(t ), t , L( w( P(t ), t ))) , that is, the utility of the importing country is
implicitly a function of the tariff.
We assume that the utility function is strictly concave, so that the optimal tariff
exists and that the labor supply curve is positively sloped (so that the optimal tariff turns
out to be positive).
Differentiating with respect to t we get
dP
dU A
∂w
= U PA
+ U tA + U LA Lw
dt
dt
∂t

To find the optimal tariff we set

U PA

dU A
=0
dt

∂w
dP
+ U tA + U LA Lw
=0
∂t
dt

U PA =

U tA =

R1A − E1A + t ( E11A − R11A ) + ( R LA − tR1AL ) Lw
EUA − tE1AU

t ( E11A − R11A ) + ( R LA − R1AL ) Lw
EUA − tE1AU

dP
−
=
dt

∂w
∂P

∂w
∂t

E11A − R11A − R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

E11A − R11A + E11M + E1MU U PM − R11M − R1AL Lw

∂w
∂P

Plugging in the expressions for

dP
, U tA , U PA and U LA and then solving we get
dt

t ( E11A − R11A ) + 2( R LA − tR1AL ) LW

∂w
∂t +

R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

E11M

R LA − tR1AL
E1M − R1M
=
R11M − E11M − E1MU U PM
− R11M + E1MU U PM
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R1AL Lw

t (1 +

∂w
∂t

R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

or

t + t(

R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

∂w
R − E + R Lw
∂t
A
11

R11M

)− 2

R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

+

E11M

R LA − tR1AL
=
− R11M + E1MU U PM

E11M

R LA − tR1AL
=
− R11M + E1MU U PM

R1M − E1M
= t0
− E11M − E1MU U PM

R11M

or

∂w
∂t

∂w
∂t

R LA Lw

A
11

)− 2

A
1L

R LA Lw

∂w
∂t

∂w
R − E + R Lw
∂t
A
11

A
11

A
1L

+

R1M − E1M
= t0
− E11M − E1MU U PM

We know that R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

curve is positively sloped. Also, 2

R LA Lw

∂w
∂t

evaluated at this optimal tariff is

∂w
R − E + R Lw
∂t
A
11

positive. Further we assume that

∂w
is unambiguously positive if the labor supply
∂t

E11M

A
11

A
1L

R LA − tR1AL
is negative since the numerator is
− R11M + E1MU U PM

positive21 and the denominator is negative. Now consider the following expression
R1AL Lw
t

∂w
∂t

R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

−2

R LA Lw

∂w
∂t

R11A − E11A + R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

+

E11M

R LA − tR1AL
− R11M + E1MU U PM

The first term is zero if t = 0 . The second and the third term are negative.

Therefore, the entire expression is negative for t = 0 . Since

R1AL Lw

∂w
∂t

∂w
R − E + R Lw
∂t
A
11

A
11

is

A
1L

t , t0
positive then we can always find a t$ ∈ ℜ , such that the above expression is zero. Let ~
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be the optimal tariffs in the presence and absence of child labor and endogenous fertility
respectively.
t = t$ , since the above expression equals zero at this value, therefore
Now consider ~
t = t 0 . In fact, we can go one step further and show that ~
t = t$ iff ~
t = t0 .
we must have ~

This implies that if the elasticity of foreign imports equals a certain value
(namely t$ ), then the optimal tariff in the absence of child labor and endogenous fertility is
the same as the optimal tariff in the presence of them. However, if t 0 < t$ then it turns out
that the optimal tariff, ~
t , is greater than t 0 . On the other hand, if t 0 > t$ then, just the
opposite result obtains. We state the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7: If t 0 < t$ ( t 0 > t$ ) then we must have t 0 < ~
t < t$ ( ~
t < t 0 < t$ ).

Proof: See above.

Comment:

Consider an increase in the tariff (from a zero tariff situation). The increase in
tariffs reduces the domestic demand for the import, and the increases the domestic supply.
As a result, the world price of the import falls. If the elasticity of the import equals a
certain value, t$ , then the reduction in price increases the foreign demand sufficiently to
absorb the increased supply of the import, in the domestic market. In that case, the optimal
tariff in the presence of child labor and endogenous fertility remains unchanged. If the
foreign elasticity is less than a certain value, then there is a further fall in the price of
import because of the increased domestic supply. In that case, the optimal tariff can be
increased to raise welfare. On the other hand, if the import elasticity is greater than t$ , then
21

Our results go through even if we do not make this assumption.

69

the increased demand of the import in the foreign market more than compensates, the
increase in domestic supply, as a result the optimal tariff has to be lowered to increase
welfare.

3.4. Conclusion

We analyze the role of tariffs in both a large country and a small country
framework. We find that in the context of a small country, the effect of tariffs on child
labor and fertility depends on the slope of the labor supply function as well as the type of
equilibrium. Strictly speaking, we underline conditions where the labor supply curve is
positively and negatively sloped. A rise in tariffs increases the wage rate, if the labor
supply curve is positively sloped. Further, fertility and child labor increases in a high
fertility equilibrium. However, in a low fertility equilibrium, fertility goes down for sure,
the effect of rise in tariffs on child labor is ambiguous. In the context of a large country, we
are able to show that, the effects of tariffs on terms of trade depend crucially on the slope
of the labor supply curve. We analyze conditions under which tariff increases may
deteriorate the terms of trade of the tariff imposing country. In that case, an import subsidy
is clearly optimal. The issue of optimal tariff in this context is discussed. We are able to
show that the optimal tariff in the presence of child labor may be lower or higher than the
optimal tariff without these conditions.
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Chapter 4
Are Preferential Trading Agreements building blocs to trade?

Abstract
We investigate whether preferential trading agreements are building blocs or stumbling
blocs to multilateral trade. We use MFN and applied tariff data for 146 countries (including the
European Union,) from 1988-2002, and conclude that free trade areas (bilateral and multination)
are stumbling blocs to trade. In other words, we find that countries that are a part of some trade
union have offer smaller tariff cuts than the ones who don’t. Customs unions, on the other hand are
not found to be neither a building bloc nor a stumbling bloc to multilateral trade liberalization.
This may be due to the fact that there is very little variation in the number of Customs unions
formed during the time period considered. We also find that countries that sign more PTAs give
have higher tariffs than countries that don’t. WTO members are also found to offer smaller tariff
cuts than non WTO members.

JEL Classification: D78; F13; F14; F15
Keywords: Preferential Trading Agreements; Free Trade Areas; Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MFN tariffs.
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4.1. Introduction

There has been a huge proliferation in the number of preferential trading
agreements (PTAs), in the world over the last decade. According to the WTO, there will be
about 300 PTAs in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members, and all the large
countries are members of some Preferential Trading Agreement, the effect of PTAs on
world trade, is at the center of debate among trade theorists and policymakers. The
dynamic time path question is, whether PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral
trade liberalization (MTL), expand in a fashion which eventually subsumes all countries as
its members without trade barriers (MTL path) or whether they undermine MTL by
fragmenting the world into a few but powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers
between each other?
If membership into PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce
multilateral tariffs because they erode the preferences given to other nations. One example
Limao (2003) provides is that of low–value bottled and bulk rum which enters the United
States, from several Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Following is
an excerpt from the Statement of Hon. Donna M.Christian-Christensen, Delegate, United
States Virgin Islands, testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, May 8th, 2001.
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“In WTO tariff negotiations in 1996, U.S and E.U. negotiators had initially
agreed to phase out all tariffs on rum and other “white spirits” by 2000. This unexpected
development was met with alarm by Caribbean Governments, Administration Officials
and Members of Congress. They emphasized to the trade negotiators that such a drastic
change in the tariff structure for rum would deal a severe blow to the economies of the
U.S. VI, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. In response to this outcry, U.S. and E.U.
negotiators, as well as Caribbean Government and producers, revisited rum tariffs (…).
These discussions, which involved governments and officials at the highest levels of the
various governments, resulted in a carefully constructed compromise for rum. Under this
compromise the United States agreed to substantially liberalize duties on expensive rum.
However, to protect the interest of the USVI and other Caribbean Island producers, the
United States also agreed to maintain existing MFN rates on low value bottled and bulk
rum.”22
Given the second best nature of the problem, there is no a-priori reason to believe
that PTAs are necessarily stumbling or building blocs. Theorists remain divided on the
wisdom of whether PTAs promote or slowdown MTL. Some authors have shown that
PTAs may be stumbling blocs to multilateral trade liberalization. Levy (1997) shows the
possibility to enter a PTA may cause a median voter to subsequently reject multilateral free
trade even though he would have accepted it if no PTA had been available. Grossman and
Helpman (1994) show that when producers are organized into lobbies, the PTAs that are
most likely to occur are the ones that cause the largest trade diversion. Krishna (1998)
shows similar results using a different setup. He also argues that these PTAs can reduce the
incentive to MTL. The reason behind the result is that the rents generated by the
22

The paragraph is taken from Limao (2003).
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formations of these PTAs, disappear when countries liberalize trade multilaterally.
Producers that benefit from PTAs, therefore, will oppose MTL. In a pure trade model with
sequential bargaining, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members may hold
back tariff concessions on goods exported by countries expected to accede to the WTO.
Limao (2002) models the interaction between PTAs between a large and a small country
(Large Small PTA or LSPTA) and MTL. He shows that LSPTAs generate a strategic
motive for large countries to maintain some of their multilateral tariffs relatively higher.
Richardson (1994) in a simple two good model with endogenous policy formulation shows
that countries may prefer FTAs over CU because of lobbying efforts of interested
industries. In an FTA domestic industries need only lobby the domestic government for
external tariffs and results in lesser degree of free riding than in a CU. The greater degree
of free riding in a CU lowers the common external tariff which implies that the external
tariff levied in an FTA are higher than under a CU. Panagariya and Findlay (1996) in a
three good Meade model show that the introduction of preferential trading can indeed raise
protection against imports from the rest of the world. They also show that if the countries
are symmetric23 then the common external tariff is lower under a CU than in an FTA.
Some authors have shown that PTAs can actually be building blocs to multilateral
trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1998) used a repeated game to analyze how PTAs affect the
incentive to set a self-enforcing tariff. They show that two countries, A and B, gain from a
PTA because they are relatively more patient, i.e., able to sustain lower tariffs for a longer
period of time than the third one, C, which is impatient in that it is unable to do the same.
If no PTA is allowed, then the same multilateral tariff is extended to C. If, however, PTAs
23

Two countries are symmetric in the sense that they choose the same external tariff under a FTA. However,
if the countries are asymmetric then the common external tariff is lower and welfare higher than the country,
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are allowed, then A and B can cooperate without reducing the tariff on C. This
discriminatory effect leads to a higher multilateral tariff. There is also an offsetting tariff
complementarity effect. When A and B lower tariffs for each other, they import more from
each other and less from C, which reduces the cost of lowering tariffs on C. There are now
two opposing effects at work, the tariff complementarity effect and the tariff
discriminatory effect.

If A and B are very patient, then the discriminatory effect

dominates, thereby leading to higher multilateral tariffs. Thus, they show that PTAs are
stumbling blocs if A and B are very patient, and building blocs otherwise.
There are two ways to test for the building or stumbling bloc effect of PTAs. First
one could test for the likelihood that PTA members participate in trade negotiations to
liberalize trade multilaterally. Alternatively, one could also test whether membership in a
PTA increases or lowers multilateral tariff barriers in comparison to multilateral trade
liberalization undertaken without any recourse to PTAs. It is easier to test the effect of
PTAs on multilateral trade barriers to infer whether they are stumbling or building blocs.
To that end Limao (2003) uses detailed data on U.S. tariff concessions, during the most
recent multilateral trade round to conclude that its PTAs were a significant stumbling bloc
to multilateral trade liberalization. He shows that, the U.S. offers smaller tariff reductions
to non-members on goods that are also imported from its PTA partners compared to goods,
which are imported only from non-partners. This is the strategic stumbling bloc effect. He,
however, focuses only on U.S. and its PTA partners.
Our empirical analysis is more general in the sense that it includes all PTAs
(except preferential arrangements granted on an individual good basis). We believe that
we are the first to conduct such a comprehensive analysis. We distinguish between
which has the higher external tariff under an FTA.
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different forms of PTAs, rather than treating them as homogenous unit, we break up PTAs
into bilateral FTAs, multination FTAs (where more than two countries participate) and
customs unions. In the empirical analysis that follows, we use MFN and applied tariff data
for 14624 countries (including the European Union) from 1988-2002 and take account of all
customs unions and free trade areas that were notified to the WTO until 2003 by these
countries.
After the 1990s, there was a significant increase in the number of PTAs. Most
countries either formed new or joined existing PTAs. However, at the same time many
countries also liberalized trade multilaterally. For instance India’s trade liberalization
process started in 1991. We use a trend to capture the secular fall in tariff due to
multilateral trade liberalization, pursued by these countries. The trend captures what
multilateral tariffs would have been if there were no PTAs. The stumbling or building bloc
effect of PTAs is measured relative to the trend. If PTAs lead to higher tariff levels than
the trend, then they are stumbling blocs and building blocs if the opposite effect is
observed. After controlling for MTL, we find that countries who are not members of any
FTA have lower tariffs than countries who are members of some FTA. We, therefore,
conclude that bilateral and multination free trade areas25 are stumbling blocs to MTL. Our
results lend support to the theoretical results that claim PTAs as stumbling blocs. Customs
unions are found to have no stumbling or building bloc effect to multilateral trade
liberalization. This may be due to the limited variation of new membership or the lack of
formation of new customs union from 1988. However our results lend support to the

24

A list of countries and the preferential agreements entered by them is provided in Table 8.
We focus our attention to Customs unions and Free Trade Areas. Preferences by countries granted under
Article V of GATT are ignored except that we take GSP into account. Since we work with average tariffs
over all goods and partner countries we do not include preferences granted on an individual good basis.

25
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theoretical result that CUs have lower multilateral tariffs than PTAs. Our results also
indicate that the WTO has been more effective than the GATT in the multilateral tariff
liberalization process. We find that average tariffs have fallen considerably after 1995 (i.e.,
after the formation of WTO).
We find that GATT/WTO members impose higher tariffs than non-WTO members
with respect to the trend. The above result is observed because the incentives to reduce
tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally are severely reduced for GATT/WTO members
since the reduction must be extended to all. Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally
creates a disincentive for preference receivers to participate in non-reciprocal trade
concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA etc. We also test the dynamic time path
question, from perspective of number of PTAs joined by a country. We test whether a
country that joins more PTAs imposes higher or lower barriers to trade than countries that
don’t. We find that countries that sign more PTAs have higher average multilateral tariffs
than those who do not. The results are qualitatively similar for different tariff measures
used.26
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the methodology and
description of the data. Results and related discussion are noted in Section 4.3.
Conclusions follow in Section 4.4. The tables and figures are contained in the Appendix.

4.2. Methodology and Data

The objective of the paper is to test whether PTAs are building or stumbling blocs
to multilateral trade liberalization. The dynamic time path question can be reformulated as

26

We use three different measures of tariffs, MFN tariff (simple average), MFN tariff (weighted average),
applied tariff (simple average).
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follows: Suppose that PTAs and MTL are adopted at the same time. Two possibilities
could arise. They could either be independent of one another or interact in some way. As
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) note, it is reasonable to assume that if simultaneously
embraced they will interact with one another. Then, will the process of PTA formation
have a malign or benign impact on MTL? Specifically, we would like to know whether the
scope of joining (or membership in) a PTA alters the tariff imposed on non-partners and if
so, in which direction. Evidence suggests that, during 1988-2002, many countries have
liberalized trade multilaterally. The liberalization process has been particularly pronounced
after 1995.27 Keeping this multilateral trade liberalization process during 1988-2002 as the
backdrop, we would like to know the role PTAs have played in this liberalization process.
Did PTAs promote or slow down MTL? One way to test this question empirically would
be to look at the tariffs imposed by PTA countries to non-PTA members compared to
countries that do not belong to any PTA.
In the model we test, we isolate the effect of PTAs (CU, bilateral FTA and
multilateral FTA) for a number of reasons. Some authors believe that Customs unions have
lower barriers to trade than free trade areas (Richardson 1994, Panagariya and Findlay
1996). Further, CUs and FTAs are very different in scope and, therefore, cannot be lumped
together as one. On a similar note, we would also like to know whether bilateral PTAs are
bigger or smaller stumbling blocs (or building blocs) to MTL than multilateral FTAs. If a
country joins more than one CU or FTA, then we take the earliest PTA into consideration.
We identify the building bloc or stumbling bloc effect in the data by the sign of the

27

The list of countries that pursued MTL on and after 1995 is available from WTO.
See www.wto.org .
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coefficient of the dummies.28

A positive and significant coefficient means a higher

average tariff level with respect to the MTL and as a result, a stumbling bloc. They are
building blocs to trade if the opposite sign is obtained.
The role of membership in GATT/WTO also deserves mention. GATT/WTO
members have a disincentive for multilateral tariff liberalization for a number of reasons.
First, any tariff reductions must be extended to all the members. Second, reducing
multilateral tariff also takes away the ability to grant preferences.
Since member countries can get tariff concessions by free riding on others, there is
a strong incentive to join the WTO. However in order to accede to the WTO a country
must submit a report on its trade practices for examination by member countries. Therefore
a country must reduce its tariff barriers. Existing members, on the other hand, have an
incentive to hold back tariff concessions to a country that is expected to join the WTO,
because the country in question will lower tariffs to become a WTO member, so no tariff
concessions are needed to gain market access.29 However countries that are acceding to the
WTO can behave strategically by reducing tariffs on goods that they import less by larger
margins than those they import heavily. Tariff reductions, undertaken in such a way would
reduce average tariff levels, required to accede to the WTO but will also restore higher
tariff levels for targeted sectors.
We empirically test for the stumbling bloc effect by estimating the following
model:

Tit = b i + a1 Cit + a2 Bit +a3 Fit +a4 WGit +a5 t+ eit
28

(1)

The building bloc or stumbling bloc effect is obtained in comparison to countries that do not have any PTA
agreements.
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where Tit is the average tariff of country i in period t. We allow each country to have a
different intercept, which is captured by bi. We create three dummy variables: Cit, Bit and
Fit, which indicate whether country i is a member of a CU, bilateral free trade areas,
multination free trade areas, respectively, at time t.30 We also create another dummy
variable for GATT/WTO membership (WGit). As mentioned earlier, we capture the
multilateral trade liberalization process that went on during the period by introducing a
trend t.31 Here, eit is the error term. Our null hypothesis is that the coefficients of CU,
Bilateral FTA, multilateral FTA and GATT/WTO dummy individually equal zero.
Furthermore, in order to determine whether more PTAs create higher barriers to
trade, we test the following model:

Tit =b i + a1 numCit + a2 numBit +a3 numFit +a4 WGit +a5 t+ eit

(2)

where numCit, numBit and numFit represent the number of CUs, Bilateral FTAs
and/or Multilateral FTAs joined by a country at time t.

Data

We use TRAINS data available from the UNCTAD.

We collect data on simple

average (MFN and applied) and weighted average tariffs (MFN) for all available reporter
countries (146) from 1988-2002. They are obtained by averaging MFN (applied tariffs)

29

Bagwell and Staiger (2003) show that WTO members hold back tariff concessions to the exports of goods
from countries expected to accede to the WTO.
30
The European Union is treated as country. As a result we create two data sets; one includes bilateral Free
Trade Agreements with EU as bilateral free trade dummies and the other as Multilateral Free Trade dummies.
This reflects the fact that a country that enters into a free trade agreement with the EU actually trades freely
with all EU members
31

This information is available from www.wto.org. We also control for multilateral trade liberalization by
using only year dummies. We find that tariffs actually increased in 1989 relative to 1988. However, except
1989 tariffs levels were roughly stable for the period 1988-1996. Average tariffs fell substantially from 1997
onwards. This shows that countries indeed pursued trade liberalization during 1995-2002.

82

over individual tariff lines and partner countries. All countries, however, do not have data
for all years. We get an unbalanced panel with 604 observations. Weighted average MFN
is calculated by using import values as weights. As mentioned before, simple average and
weighted average tariffs (MFN) and applied tariffs (simple average) have declined during
1988-2002. The decline has been particularly pronounced after 1995 (see Figure 1-2).32
To draw any conclusions on whether PTAs are building or stumbling blocs we need
to look at the MFN tariff because preferences granted on a bilateral basis or among a few
countries through a PTA, perhaps should not be treated as multilateral trade liberalization,
if the tariffs imposed outside the PTA also increases. For instance, some countries may
reduce tariff barriers among each other through a PTA but maintain higher tariffs for the
rest of the world.33 As a result we look at what happens to multilateral tariffs levels when a
country, in question, joins a PTA.
We, however, also look at average applied tariffs.34 Applied tariffs are obtained by
choosing the minimum of MFN tariff and preferential rates. We present our results for both
MFN (simple average and weighted average) tariff and applied tariff (simple average35) in
the next section.

4.3. Results

We test the first specification of our model (equation 1) with simple average MFN
(Table 2) and weighted average MFN (Table 4). We carried out a Hausman Test and
rejected the random effects model in every case.
32

Some descriptive statistics are included in Table 1.
Bhagwati (1993).
34
If a country offers a preferential rate for some goods to another country, then the applied tariff will take
that into account. As a result simple average applied tariff will be lower than simple MFN tariff.
33
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We find that the coefficient of Customs union has a negative sign but is not
significantly different from zero for any measure of tariff we use (Tables 2 & 4). As noted
earlier, this may be due to the limited variation in the number of Customs unions formed
during the time period we consider. The coefficients of bilateral and multilateral Free trade
areas, however, are positive and significantly different from zero36 for all measures used.
The positive and significant coefficient of the bilateral and multilateral dummy
implies that countries that have joined an FTA have higher average tariffs with respect to
the trend.37 As mentioned before the trend captures what multilateral tariffs would have
been if no PTAs existed. Since countries that did not join any FTA must have lower tariffs
because of MTL, it is therefore clear that FTAs are stumbling blocs to MTL. Our results
support the strand of theoretical literature that show that PTAs are stumbling blocs.
We find that the coefficient of GATT/WTO membership is positive and significant
when we use a trend to capture the multilateral trade liberalization process. However, the
coefficient becomes insignificant, when we use year dummies for simple average MFN
tariffs. We again get positive and significant coefficients, when weighted MFN tariffs are
used, regardless of whether we use the trend or year dummies to capture MTL (Table 4).
This suggests that countries, while deciding to become members of the GATT/WTO, take
into account trade volumes in order to determine tariffs reductions. Tariff reductions are
lower on goods that they import heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones

35

We use only the simple average applied tariff to ignore trade diversion effects. Trade diversion effects are
likely to larger when weighted applied tariff are used.
36
The coefficients of bilateral and multilateral FTA dummies are not significantly different from each other.
Richardson (1994) and Panagariya and Findlay (1996) shows that tariffs are higher when countries form a
FTA rather than a CU. Our results confirm this finding.
37
The coefficients of all the dummies are not significantly different from zero when we don’t include a trend
in our regression. This suggests that the formation of PTAs alone cannot explain the downward fall in tariffs.
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that are imported less heavily, with respect to the trend. Thus there is some strategic
interplay between members of the GATT/WTO when they liberalize trade multilaterally.
The use of year dummies (d89 – d02) allows each year to have a different intercept
and is therefore able to account for variations on a yearly basis. We choose 1988 as the
base year. We find that simple average tariff actually increased from 1988 to 1989. Simple
average MFN and weighted average tariffs for the years 1990-1996 were not significantly
different from average tariff levels in 1988. The decline in tariffs began in 1997. This
strongly suggests that countries have liberalized trade multilaterally after 1995.
We create a dummy for GSP preferences granted. We find that the sign of the
coefficient of the GSP dummy is positive but is not significantly different from zero for
any measure of tariff used (Table 2 & 4). This may be due to the fact that the dummy
assigns a value of one to countries that grant GSP over all goods in a given year, however,
GSP is granted on an individual good basis and are applied to only a range of products.
This might explain why our estimate for the coefficient of GSP dummy is not significant
when simple average and weighted average MFN tariffs are used.
The magnitude of the coefficient also deserves some mention. For the average
MFN tariff, we find that countries that join some bilateral PTAs have 21% higher tariffs
than the average. Similarly multination PTA members, impose tariffs that are 24% higher
than the average. GATT/WTO members also have tariffs that are about 23% higher than
the average. Results for the weighted average MFN are similar.
We also test what happens to average MFN tariffs (Table 3) and weighted average
MFN (Table 5) when a country joins more PTAs following equation 2. The coefficients for
the number of bilateral and multilateral free trade areas are positive and significantly
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different from zero when we use average MFN tariffs. This suggests that countries that
have joined more FTAs have higher average tariffs, with respect to the trend.

For

weighted average MFN tariffs we find that only the coefficient of the number of
multilateral tariff is significant. This implies that countries that join more multilateral
FTAs are bigger stumbling blocs to trade than the ones who join more bilateral FTAs. We
do not find significant coefficients for the number of CUs joined. This may be because
there are no countries that have joined more than one CU. We include both the
GATT/WTO and GSP dummy in this specification. The coefficient of GSP is not
significant for any measure of tariffs used as before. The coefficient of the GATT/WTO
specification is not significantly different from zero.
The magnitude of the coefficient, as before, is also of importance here. For the
simple average MFN tariff, we find that joining one more bilateral PTA increases the tariff
by 2% with respect to the average. Joining another multination PTA increases the tariff by
19% with respect to the tariff. We also find similar results for the weighted average MFN
tariffs.
Now we turn to test our first and second specification of our model with simple
average applied tariffs. The average applied tariff follows the same pattern as average
MFN and weighted average MFN tariffs. The average applied tariff increased in 1989. The
average tariff levels remained the roughly the same till 1996. Tariffs started falling
significantly after 1996.
The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. We find that for the
first specification (Table 6) the co-efficient of the CU dummy has a negative sign but is not
significantly different from zero. The coefficients of Bilateral and multilateral FTA
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dummies are positive significant. The GATT/WTO dummy is also positive and significant.
The interpretations of the coefficient of the dummies remain the same as before. The
magnitudes of the coefficients, using average applied tariffs, are similar to the other cases
(Average MFN and weighted average MFN tariffs) and carry the same interpretation.
When we introduce a set of year dummies for into this specification, we find that
the results are not affected except that the coefficient of GATT/WTO dummy is no longer
significant as mentioned before. This may be because of the fact that GATT/WTO
members give larger tariff reductions on good that they import less relative to the ones they
import more heavily from other WTO members.
We also include preferences granted under GSP in our regression together with the
trend. The results are qualitatively similar to the other cases we have examined.

The

coefficient of the GSP dummy has the expected sign but is not significant for the same
reason as noted above.
For the second specification (equation 2) we find that countries that join more
bilateral PTAs have higher tariffs relative to the trend. A notable difference is that the
coefficient of multilateral free trade areas becomes insignificant when average applied
tariffs are used which may occur because upon joining a multilateral free trade areas, a
country reduces its tariffs on more countries than under a bilateral FTA, thereby reducing
simple applied average by a larger margin than in a bilateral FTA.
The magnitude of the coefficients for the second specification using the average
applied tariff is somewhat different from the other cases. For the average applied tariff, we
find that joining another bilateral trading union increases the average applied tariff by 2%;
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however, joining another multination PTA does not seem to increase the tariff. This may
be due to the reason noted above.
As with the first specification, we also include GSP dummies. We find that the
coefficient of GSP is positive in sign but not significant. Overall, we find that the
stumbling bloc effect of FTAs is robust to different tariff measures used. For the first
specification the coefficient of both bilateral and multilateral dummies are positive and
significant. For the second specification the coefficient of the number of bilateral FTAs is
positive and significant, however the sign of the coefficient of the number of multilateral
FTAs is not significantly different from zero for reasons noted above.

4.4. Conclusion

Our analysis shows that countries that are members of bilateral or multilateral free
trade areas have higher average MFN (both simple and weighted) and applied tariffs than
countries that are not. This results support the theoretical finding that PTAs are stumbling
blocs [Bhagwati (1993), Levy (1997), Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and Krishna (1998)].
We also find that GATT/WTO members offer smaller tariff cuts on goods that they import
heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones they import less with respect to
the trend because the incentives to reduce tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally are
severely reduced for GATT/WTO members since the reduction must be extended to all.
Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally creates a disincentive for preference receivers to
participate in non-reciprocal trade concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA, etc. We
also find that WTO has been a more effective in reducing tariffs multilaterally than the
GATT. We test our model with three alternate measures of tariffs. Our results are robust to
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all measures. Finally, we find that a country that joins more PTAs have higher multilateral
tariffs than countries that don’t. Our results are robust except that the coefficient of number
of multilateral Free trade areas is not significant when we use average applied tariffs
because as a country signs more PTAs (multilaterally), it reduces its tariffs over more
countries (multilateral FTA members) compared to a bilateral FTA, thereby reducing the
applied average by more than under a bilateral FTA. As a result, we do not find countries
that join more multilateral trade areas to have higher applied average tariffs than countries
that don’t.
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Appendix

Figure 1: Simple average MFN and applied tariffs during 1988-2002

25
20
15

avgtmhs
avgt

10
5

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

0

wavgtmhs: Weighted average MFN tariffs; avgt: Applied average tariffs

92

Figure 2: Weighted average MFN and applied tariffs during 1988-2002
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Table 1: Some Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

avgt

overall
between
within

13.58191 9.930901
8.538261
5.220495

0 100.3265 N = 598
0 49.9749 n = 146
-17.4583 63.9335 T-bar = 4.09589

avgtmhs

overall
between
within

14.00378 9.683278
8.325272
5.214538

0 100.406 N = 604
0 50.0022 n = 148
-17.058 64.40758 T-bar = 4.08108

wavgt

overall
between
within

11.21543 8.599598
7.364318
4.508873

0 87.05174 N = 599
0 45.39585 n = 146
-13.442 52.87133 T-bar = 4.10274

wavgtmhs overall
between
within

11.59158 8.401111
7.18505
4.575619

0 87.05174 N = 605
0 45.3999 n = 148
-13.0629 53.24342 T-bar = 4.08784
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Table 2
Results from regressing average MFN tariff (avgtmhs) on Preferential
Trading Agreements using fixed effects
Variables
Constant

Estimates

Estimates

Estimates

Estimates

1585.9***
(157.3)

1560.84***
(155.96)

1560.84***
(151.96)

-0.79***
(0.08)
-1.63
(3.13)

-0.78***
(0.08)
-1.71
(3.13)

-0.77***
(0.07)
-1.70
(3.13)

….
-1.17
(3.21)

Bilateral FTA
Dummy

2.95**
(1.31)

2.99**
(1.31)

2.99**
(1.31)

2.52**
(1.31)

Multination
FTA
Dummy

3.40**
(1.56)

3.50**
(1.56)

3.49**
(1.56)

3.46**
(1.64)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

3.36**
(1.72)

3.29**
(1.72)

3.28*
(1.72)

2.82
(1.75)

Preferential
Arrangement

3.80
(3.16)

….

….

-1.41
(0.98)

….

….

No

No

No

Yes

0.190

0.191

0.188

0.210

Trend
Customs
Union
Dummy

WTO

Year
Dummies
R2
No. of Obs.

….

….

14.60***
(2.45)

604

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level
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Table 3
Results from regressing average MFN tariff (avgtmhs) on number of PTAs using
fixed effects.
Variables
Constant

Estimates
1526.71***
(152.02)

Estimates
1270.76***
(229.45)

Estimates
1526.83***
(151.85)

Trend

-0.76***
(0.07)

-0.63***
(0.12)

-0.76***
(0.08)

Number of
Customs
Unions

-1.97
(3.13)

-1.96
(3.12)

-1.97
3.12

-1.42
(3.21)

Number of
Bilateral FTA

0.29*
(0.17)

0.29**
(0.14)

0.29**
(0.14)

0.25*
(0.14)

Number of
multination
FTA

2.71**
(1.18)

2.92**
(1.19)

2.72**
(1.18)

2.38*
(1.26)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

3.03*
(1.71)

2.89*
(1.71)

3.03*
(1.71)

2.54
(1.75)

Preferential
Arrangements

0.25
(3.68)

….

….

….

WTO

….

-1.47
(0.99)

….

….

Year Dummies

No

No

No

0.182

0.191

0.187

R2
No. of Obs.

Estimates
15.43***
(2.44)
….

Yes

0.208

604

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level;*significant at the 10% level
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Table 4
Results from regressing weighted average MFN tariff (wavgtmhs) on PTA
dummies with fixed effects.
Variables
Constant

Estimates
1488.92***
(135.82)

Estimates
1261.91***
(201.48)

Estimates
1458.08***
(134.92)

Trend

-0.74***
(0.06)

-0.63***
(0.10)

-0.73***
(0.07)

Customs
Union Dummy

0.93
(2.7)

0.84
(2.70)

0.83
(2.71)

1.34
2.77

Bilateral FTA
Dummy

2.33**
(1.12)

2.31**
(1.13)

2.38**
(1.13)

1.87*
(1.13)

Multination
FTA Dummy

2.94**
(1.35)

3.27**
(1.36)

3.06**
(1.35)

2.95**
(1.41)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

3.79***
(1.48)

3.60**
(1.49)

3.71***
(1.49)

3.15**
(1.51)

Preferential
Arrangement

4.68*
(2.72)

….

….

…

.…

-1.12
(0.86)

….

…

No

No

Yes

0.213

0.21

0.233

WTO

Year Dummies

No

R2

0.215

No. of Obs.

Estimates
12.32***
(2.09)
…

605

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level
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Table 5
Results from regressing weighted average MFN tariff (wavgtmhs) on number of
PTAs using fixed effects.
Variables
Constant

Estimates
1388.42***
(129.31)

Estimates
1241.36***
(197.92)

Trend

-0.72***
(0.06)

-0.62***
(0.10)

-0.72***
(0.07)

Number of
Customs
Unions

0.68
(2.69)

0.68
(2.69)

0.67
(2.69)

1.24
(2.76)

Number of
Bilateral FTAs

0.21
(0.14)

0.25**
(0.12)

0.26**
(0.12)

0.22*
(0.12)

Number of
Multination
FTAs

2.65**
(1.02)

2.88***
(1.03)

2.72***
(1.02)

2.38**
(1.08)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

3.55**
(1.48)

3.40**
(1.48)

3.51**
(1.48)

2.95**
(1.51)

Preferential
Arrangement

1.92
(3.19)

….

….

….

WTO

….

-1.20
(0.85)

Year Dummies

No

No

No

0.204

0.217

0.214

R2
No. Obs.

Estimates
1449.67***
(130.98)

Estimates
12.82***
(2.08)
….

….

Yes

0.235

605

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level;* significant at the 10% level
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Table 6
Results from regressing applied average tariff (avgt) on PTA dummies using
fixed effects.
Variables
Cons

Estimates
1514.03***
(158.86)

Estimates
1239.66***
235.49

Estimates
1490.25***
157.51

-0.61***
(0.12)

-0.74***
(0.08)

Estimates
13.85***
(2.48)

Trend

-0.75***
(0.08)

Customs Union
Dummy

-1.86
(3.15)

-1.92
(3.15)

-1.93
(3.15)

-1.26
(3.24)

Bilateral FTA
Dummy

2.58**
(1.32)

2.53*
(1.32)

2.62**
(1.32)

2.18*
(1.33)

Multination FTA
Dummy

2.87*
(1.58)

3.23**
(1.59)

2.96*
(1.58)

3.04*
(1.65)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

3.10*
(1.73)

2.90*
(1.73)

3.03*
(1.73)

2.60
(1.77)

Preferential
Arrangements

3.60
(3.18)

….

….

….

WTO

….

-1.43
(1.00)

….

….

Year Dummies

No

No

No

Yes

0.178

0.177

0.174

0.195

R2
No. Obs.

….

604

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7
Results from regressing average applied tariff ( avgt) on number of PTAs
using fixed effects.
Variables
Constant

Trend

Estimates
1461.03***
(153.86)

Estimates
1214.57***
(231.99)

Estimates
1461.00***
(153.29)

Estimates
14.83***
(2.47)

-0.72***
(0.78)

-0.60
(0.12)

-0.73***
(0.08)

….

Number of
Customs
Union

-2.20
(3.15)

-2.19
(3.15)

-2.20
(3.15)

-1.55
(3.24)

Number of
Bilateral
Dummy

0.33**
(0.16)

0.32**
(0.14)

0.33**
(0.14)

0.29**
(0.14)

Number of
Multination
FTAs

1.7
(1.19)

1.89
(1.20)

1.70
(1.19)

1.42
(1.27)

GATT/WTO
Dummy

2.76
(1.73)

2.63
(1.73)

2.77
(1.73)

2.30
(1.77)

Preferential
Arrangement

-0.50
(3.72)

….

….

….

WTO

….

-1.41
(1.00)

….

….

Year
Dummies

No

No

No

Yes

R2

0.17

0.178

0.175

0.194

No. Obs.

604

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level;** significant at the 5% level;* significant at the 10% level
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Table 8: List of Countries with PTAs by Date of entry into Force (pages 100 – 104)

Name

Multilateral Free
Bilateral Free Trade Trade

Customs Union

Pref erences

A lbania
A lgeria

EC(76)

GSTP(90)

A ntigua and Barbuda

CA RICOM(74)

A rgentina

MERCOSUR(91)

A rmenia

Georgia(95)
Kyrgyz(98)

CIS(94)

A ustralia

CER(83)

PA TCRA (77)

Georgia(94)

CIS(94)

A ustria
A zerbaijan

EFTA (60)

GSTP(90),LA IA (81)

SPA RTECA (81)
EC(95)
ECO(92)

Bahamas, The

CA RICOM(83)

Bahrain

GCC(91)
BA (76), SA PTA (95),
GSTP(89), PTN(73)

Bangladesh
Barbados

CA RICOM(73)

Belarus

CIS(94)

EA EC(97)

Belize
Benin

GSTP(91),WA EMU(00)

Bermuda
Bhutan

SA PTA (95)

Bolivia

CA N(88), GSTP(89),
LA IA (81)

Bosnia& Herzegovina

Turkey(02),
Croatia(01)

Brazil

MERCOSUR(91)

Brunei

Bulgaria

PTN(73), LA IA (81),
GSTP(91)
A FTA /A SEA N(92)

Lithuania(02),
Israel(02),
Estonia(02),
Turkey(99),
Macedonia(00)

EC(93), EFTA (93),
CEFTA (99)

Burkina Faso

WA EMU(00)

Cambodia

A FTA (99)

Cameroon

CEMA C(99),GSTP(92)

Canada

CUFTA (89), Costa
Rica(02), Chile(97)

NA FTA (95)

Cntrl A f rican Republic

CEMA C(99)

Chad

Chile

CEMA C(99)
Costa Rica(02),
Mexico(99),
Canada(97)

GSTP(89), LA IA (81),
PTN(73)
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Nam e

Bilateral Free Trade

Multilateral Free
Trade

Custom s Union

China
Colombia

MERCOSUR(92)

Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica

CACM(61)
WAEMU(00)

Bosnia &Herz(01),
Slovenia(98)

EC(02),EFTA(02)

Cuba

GSTP(89)

Cyprus

Czech Republic

CAN(88), LAIA(81)
CEMAC(99)

Chile (02), Canada(02)

Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia

Preferences
BA(01)

EC-Cyprus(73)
Turkey(98), Latvia(97),
Lithuania(97),
Estonia(98), Israel(97)

Czechoslovakia

EC(92), EFTA(92),
CEFTA(93)

Slovak(93)

EC(92), EFTA(92)

Dominica

CARICOM(74)

Dominican Republic
CAN(88),GSTP(90),LAIA
(81)

Ecuador

Egypt, Arab Rep.

COMESA(94),GSTP(89),
PTN(73),TRIPARTITE(68)

EC-Egypt(77)

El Salvador

CACM(61)

Equatorial Guinea

Estonia
Ethiopia (excludes
Eritrea)

Hungary(01),
Bulgaria(02),
Faeroe(98), Czech(98),
Slovak(98), Turkey(98),
Ukraine(96),
EC(95), EFTA(96),
Slovenia(97)
BAFTA(94)
COMESA(81)

Finland

EFTA(61)

EC(95)

Gabon

Georgia

CEMAC(99)
Armenia(98),
Kazakh(99),
Turkmenistan(00),
Ukraine(96),
Azerbaijan(96)

CIS(94)

Ghana

GSTP(89)

Grenada

CARICOM(73)

Guatemala

CACM(61)

Guinea-Bissau

WAEMU(00)

Guyana

CARICOM(73)

Honduras

CACM(61)

GSTP(89)

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Lithuania(00),
Estonia(01), Latvia(00), EC(92), EFTA(93),
Israel(98), Turkey(98)
CEFTA(93)

Iceland

Faeroe(93)

India

EC(73), EFTA(70)
BA(76), GSTP(85),
SAPTA(95),
TRIPARTITE(68)

Sri Lanka(01)
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Name

Bilateral Free Trade

Multilateral Free Trade Customs Union

Preferences

Indonesia

AFTA(92),GSTP(89)

Iran, Islamic Rep.

ECO(92),GSTP(92)

Israel

Mexico(00), Bulgaria(02),
Slovenia(98), Czech(97),
Hungary(98), Poland(98),
Slovak(98), Turkey(97),
US(85)
EC(00), EFTA(93)

Jamaica

PTN(73)
CARICOM(73)

Japan

Singapore(02)

Jordan

US(01)

EC(02), EFTA(02)

Kenya

COMESA(81), EAC(00)

Korea, Rep.

BA(76), PTN(73)

Kuwait

GCC(84)

Kyrgyz Republic

Russian Fedr(93),
Armenia(95),
Ukraine(98),
Uzbekistan(98),
Kazakhstan(95),
Moldova(96)

Lao PDR

Thailand (91)

Latvia

Turkey(00), Poland(99),
Hungary(00), Slovak(97), EC(95),EFTA(96),
Slovenia(96), Czech(97) BAFTA(94)

CIS(94)

EAEC(97)

ECO(92)
BA(76), AFTA(97)

Lebanon
Libya

GSTP(89)

Lithuania

Bulgaria(02),
Hungary(00), Slovak(97),
Slovenia(97), Czech(97), EC(95),EFTA(96),BAFTA
Turkey(98), Poland(97) (94)

Macedonia, FYR

Bulgaria(00), Turkey(00),
Slovenia(96)
EC(01), EFTA(01)

Madagascar

COMESA(81)

Malawi

COMESA(81)

Malaysia

AFTA(92), GSTP(89)

Maldives

SAPTA(95)

Mali

WAEMU(00)

Malta

EC(71)

Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico

Israel(00), Chile(99)

EC(00), EFTA(01),
NAFTA(95)
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COMESA(81)
GSTP(89), LAIA(81),
PTN(73)

Name

Bilateral Free Trade

Multilateral Free Trade

Moldova

Romania(95), Kyrgyz(96)

CIS(94)

Montserrat

Customs Union

Preferences

CARICOM(74)

Morocco

EC(99), EFTA(00)

GSTP(97)

Mozambique

GSTP(90)

Myanmar

AFTA(97),GSTP(97)

Nepal
New Zealand

SAPTA(95)
CER(83) Singapore(01)

SPARTECA

Nicaragua

CACM(61)

Niger

WAEMU(00)

Nigeria
Norway

GSTP(89)
GSTP(89)

Faeroe(93)

EC(73), EFTA(60)

Oman

GCC(84)
ECO(92), GSTP(89),
SAPTA(95)

Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea

PATCRA(73)

Paraguay

MSG(93),SPARTECA(81)
MERCOSUR(88)

Peru
Philippines
Turkey(01), Latvia(98),
Faeroe Is(99), Israel(98),
Lithuania(97)

EC(92),EFTA(93),
CEFTA(93)

Romania

Romania(95), Turkey(98)

EC(93), EFTA(93),
CEFTA(97)

Russian Federation

Kyrgyz(93), Georgia(94)

CIS(94)

Poland
Qatar

LAIA(81), PTN(73)
CAN(88), GSTP(89),
LAIA(81), PTN(73)
AFTA(92), GSTP(92),
PTN(73)

GCC(84)
GSTP(89), PTN(73)

Rwanda

COMESA(81)

Saudi Arabia

GCC(84)

Senegal

WAEMU(00)

Seychelles

COMESA(94)

Singapore

Japan(02)

GSTP(89)

Slovak Republic

Turkey(98), Latvia(97),
Lithuania(97), Estonia(98), EC(92),EFTA(92),
Israel(97)
CEFTA(93)

Slovenia

Bosnia & Herz(02),
Turkey(00), Israel(98),
Croatia(98), Latvia(96),
Macedonia(96),
EC(97), EFTA(95),
Estonia(97), Lithuania(97) CEFTA(96)

Czech-Slovak(93)

Solomon Islands

MSG(93), SPARTECA(89)

South Africa
Sri Lanka

EC(00)
BA(76), GSTP(89),
SAPTA(95)

India(01)

St. Kitts and Nevis

CARICOM(74)
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Name

Bilateral Free Trade

Multilateral Free
Trade

St. Lucia
St.Vincent &
Grenadines

Customs
Union
CARICOM(74)
CARICOM(74)

Sudan

COMESA(81),GSTP(91)

Suriname

CARICOM(95)

Sw eden
Sw itzerland

Preferences

EFTA(60)
Faeroe(96)

Syrian Arab Republic

EC(95)

EC(73),EFTA(60)
EC(77)

Taiw an, China
Tajikistan

CIS(94)

ECO(92)

Tanzania
Thailand

EAC(00), GSTP(89)
Laos (91)

AFTA(92), GSTP(89)

Togo

WAEMU(00)

Trinidad and Tobago

CARICOM(73)

GSTP(89)

Tunisia

EC(98)

GSTP(89),PTN(73)

Tunisia

EC(98)

GSTP(89), PTN(73)

EFTA(92), EC(96)

PTN(73)

Turkey

Poland(00), Slovenia(00),
Czech(98), Slovak(98),
Bulgaria(99), Macedonia(00),
Romania(98), Lithuania(98),
Hungary(98), Estonia(98),
Israel(97)

Turkmenistan

Georgia(00)

ECO(92)

Uganda
Ukraine
United States

COMESA(94), EAC(00)
Kyrgyz(98), Estonia(96),
Georgia(96)
CIS(94)
CUFTA(89), Jordan(01), Israel
(85)
NAFTA(95)

Uruguay

MERCOSUR(88)

LAIA(81), PTN(73)

CIS(94)

Venezuela

ECO(92)
MSG(93),
SPARTECA(81)
CAN(88), GSTP(99),
LAIA(81)

Vietnam

AFTA(95), GSTP(89)

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyz(98)

Vanuatu

Yemen
Zambia

COMESA(81)

Zimbabw e

COMESA(94), GSTP(89)
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
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5.1. Conclusion:

In this chapter we briefly summarize and conclude the contributions of this
dissertation to the literature. We break up the conclusion in three different subsections.
Each subsection will be devoted for each chapter of the dissertation.

5.2.1 Endogenous Fertility, Educational Attainment and Child Labor: Do
Subsidies work?

It is hard to overstate the importance of looking into the problem of child labor.
Given that about 40% of all children are engaged in some form of child labor without
having the option of going to school is indeed painful. However the main concern lies in
the fact that due to lack of adequate human capital formation the capacity for growth in
countries where child labor is rampant are severely hampered. That explains in part why
governments in these countries have given such importance to the eradication of child
labor. The prime instrument has been to provide these children with education so that they
may earn a better living in the future.
Various programs have been designed to achieve this target. Compulsory
education, government sponsored vocational education programs, building new schools,
giving financial support in cash or in kind to households those harbor child labor. We
analyze the role of education subsidies and its effect on child labor in a one good model
where parents decide how many children to have and the level of education for them.
Parents are assumed to care about not only the quantity of children but also on total
quality. We find that the response to education subsidies depends on whether households
attach more weight to the number of children going to school or the educational level of
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each child. We show that lump sum education subsidies may increase (or decrease) the
equilibrium level of education and child labor depending on whether parents attach more
weight to quality (or the number of children in school ) ignoring fertility effects. Marginal
education subsidies, in general, have the exact opposite effect. Since marginal and lump
sum education subsidies affect child labor in opposite directions, education subsidies
including elements of both may fail to decrease the incidence of child labor
In fact, educational subsidies given under PROGRESA are observed to have very
little effect on the incidence of child labor. We are also able to throw light on the empirical
finding that educational subsidies have no discernible effect on parents’ decision to send a
child to work. If fertility effects are included then our results follow provided fertility
effects are small magnitude.
Cartwright (1999) analyzes 1993 survey data for rural and urban children in
Columbia and finds that the more expensive schooling is, the less likely it is that the child
will work. She suggests that here the cost of education serves as a proxy for school quality.
However in most developing countries schools, which cater to the poor in both rural and
urban regions, are more likely to be of low quality. Most schools are inadequately staffed
and lack facilities such as running tap water, sanitation etc. Thus quality considerations
cannot explain why child labor decreases in response to a rise in the cost of schooling.
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find that cost of schooling increases the probability
that a child will work in Bolivia. Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) analyze the work and
school choices in Ghana, and find that cost of schooling increases both the probability of
work and the probability of school attendance. We are able to explain why one may
observe seemingly contradictory effects of education on child labor across countries.
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5.2.2 Endogenous Fertility, Child Labor and Optimal Tariffs

The recent proliferation of preferential trading agreements has been of growing
concern among trade theorist. The initial skepticism was centered on whether preferential
trading agreements were a movement towards or away from free trade. If it was a
movement away from free trade then who gains and who loses? This has created a discord
among trade theorist. Some opine that preferential trading agreements are welfare
improving while others argue that they are not. In so far as trade movements determine
factor incomes, the role of trade liberalization through a multilateral system like the WTO
or through preferential trading agreements is important. Given that many countries that
host child labor also have joined preferential trading agreements or have liberalized trade,
the consequence of such liberalization process on child labor needs to be examined. We
develop a model to address these questions. We find that trade liberalization through any
means have a direct impact both on fertility and the incidence of child labor.
Since tariff reduction is the main instrument for freeing trade, we analyze the role
of tariffs in both a large country and a small country framework. We find that in the
context of a small country, the effect of tariffs on child labor and fertility depends on the
slope of the labor supply function as well as the type of equilibrium. Strictly speaking, we
underline conditions where the labor supply curve is positively and negatively sloped. A
rise in tariffs increases the wage rate, if the labor supply curve is positively sloped. Further
fertility and child labor increases in high fertility equilibrium. However, in a low fertility
equilibrium fertility goes down for sure, the effect of rise in tariffs on child labor is
ambiguous. In the context of a large country we are able to show that the effects of tariffs
depend crucially on the slope of the labor supply curve. We further analyze conditions
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under which tariff increases may deteriorate the terms of trade of the tariff imposing
country. In that case an import subsidy is clearly optimal. The issue of optimal tariff in this
context is discussed. We are able to show that the optimal tariff in the presence of child
labor may be lower or higher than the optimal tariff without these conditions.

5.2.3 Are Preferential Trading Agreements Stumbling Blocs to Trade?

According to the WTO there will be about 300 hundred preferential trading
agreements (PTAs) in force by 2005. Given that most WTO members and all the largest
countries are a part of some preferential trading agreement the effect of PTAs on the world
trading system is hard to overemphasize. The dynamic time path question is whether
PTAs, in isolation or in tandem with multilateral trade liberalization (MTL), expand in a
fashion which eventually subsumes all countries as its members without trade barriers
(MTL path) or whether they undermine MTL by fragmenting the world into a few but
powerful trading unions with higher trade barriers between each other?
If membership into PTA entails lower tariffs for all countries regardless of
membership status, then PTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade because it supplants
the multilateral trade liberalization path through the GATT or WTO. If membership in a
PTA, however, implies higher tariffs to non-members, then it is necessarily a stumbling
bloc. There is some anecdotal evidence that countries often do not want to reduce
multilateral tariffs because they erode the preferences given to other nations. There is no a
priori reason to believe that PTAs are building or stumbling. This is because the second
best nature of the problem. Although the literature on PTA is enormous there is very little
empirical evidence for or against PTAs. We examine the role of PTAs in terms of whether
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they are building blocs or stumbling blocs to multilateral trade. We analyze data on 146
countries for the period 1988-2002.
Our analysis shows that countries that are members of bilateral or multilateral Free
trade areas have higher average MFN (both simple and weighted) and applied tariffs than
countries that are not. These results support the theoretical finding that PTAs are stumbling
blocs [Bhagwati (1993), Levy (1997), Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and Krishna (1998)].
We also find that GATT/WTO members offer smaller tariff cuts on goods that they import
heavily from other WTO members compared to the ones they import less with respect to
the trend. This is because the incentives to reduce tariffs, by large margins, multilaterally
are severely reduced for GATT/WTO members since the reduction must be extended to all.
Moreover, reducing tariffs multilaterally creates a disincentive for preference receivers to
participate in non-reciprocal trade concessions program such as the GSP, ATPA, etc. We
also find that WTO has been a more effective in reducing tariffs multilaterally than the
GATT. We test our model with three alternate measures of tariffs. Our results are robust to
all measures. Finally, we claim that a country that joins more FTAs have higher
multilateral tariffs than countries that don’t. We find that multilateral free trade areas are
bigger stumbling blocs to trade when MFN tariffs are used. However, the coefficient of
number of multilateral free trade areas is not significant when we use average applied
tariffs. This is because as a country signs more PTAs (multilaterally), it reduces its tariffs
over more countries (multilateral FTA members) compared to a bilateral FTA, thereby
reducing the applied average by more than under a bilateral FTA. As a result we do not
find countries that join more multilateral trade areas to have higher applied average tariffs
than countries that don’t.
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